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Abstract 
Burundi’s current political crisis was launched by demonstrations against President Nkurunziza’s 
third mandate in April 2015 and a coup attempt the following month. It has led to political killings, 
an outflow of refugees, damaged the country’s media and made many opposition and civil society 
activists and opposition politicians leave for exile. Various international organisations have accused 
Burundi’s government of serious human rights violations. 
The political confrontation in the crisis has been formed around the opposition and civil society in 
exile in Belgium, represented by an umbrella alliance called CNARED, and the Burundian 
government led by the CNDD-FDD party. The East African Community has attempted to establish 
a dialogue between the parties but has not succeeded in bringing all the actors to the same table. 
Many international actors and organisations have commented the Burundian conflict and presented 
their analysis of the conflict issues. On the contrary, this study encompasses the local aspect of the 
conceptualisations of the conflict. It is a pioneering case study on the narratives of violence and 
dialogue in the political crisis in 2015–17 by the Burundian government, opposition and civil 
society and their supporters. 
The study uses the theory of radical disagreement and the structuration theory to analyse the 
discrepancies in conflict narratives between the conflict actors. On the methodological level, it uses 
discourse and narrative analysis. The data for the study was gathered by interviewing politically 
active members of the Burundian diaspora in Brussels and by collecting social media, news article 
and video material. 
The main findings of the study are that there are radical disagreements between the parties about the 
way that the violence is defined, about deciding who can participate in the dialogue on the conflict 
issues and about the right of President Nkurunziza to seek a third term. The dialogue has been 
reduced to a monologue, although inclusive dialogue is the objective of all the conflict parties. 
These issues explain the current tension between the conflict parties. 
 
Keywords: dialogue, post-electoral violence, conceptualisations, narratives, conflict 
transformation, peacebuilding.   
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1. Introduction 
 
We are being exterminated. We don’t know where to go. We have no refuge. 
 
The cry of a Burundian woman in a documentary made by France24 on the refugees in Burundi’s 
political crisis illustrates the desperate situation of Burundian civilians that have had to flee the recent 
violence in this East African country. The outflow of refugees is only one of the consequences of 
Burundi’s political crisis that this study examines. 
The small land-locked Burundi, home to a population of 11,2 million people, is one of the world’s 
five poorest countries with 64,9 % of the population living below the poverty line (World Bank, 
2016). In spring 2015, Burundi plunged into a violent political crisis that has triggered flows of 
refugees and internal displacement as well as hindered access to basic services. Due to the worsening 
socio-economic conditions coupled with several natural and climatic catastrophes, three million 
Burundians were in need of immediate humanitarian assistance by the end of 2016 (Equipe 
Humanitaire Pays, 2016, p. 5). 
Despite the daily suffering of many Burundians, the country’s crisis is rarely present on the front 
pages of the international media. This is probably due to Burundi’s small size and its relatively 
minimal importance from a Western point of view. However, the Burundian case is part of a more 
general African debate on presidential mandates as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. 
Another reason why Burundi’s relapse to violence is interesting is that Burundi has been the target of 
various peacebuilding efforts since the 1990s. One of the two first country-specific programmes of 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission was implemented there. The international community wanted to 
react to the Burundian civil war with determination after what had happened in Rwanda. (Jobbins and 
Ahitungiye, 2015, p. 206) 
‘The local’ has become a centre of interest in peace and conflict research as a consequence of the 
local turn in peacebuilding. Richmond (2014) argues that liberal peacebuilding offers a universal 
framework that does not sufficiently take into account the local actors’ visions of creating a society 
specific to their culture, history and needs (p. 109). Although peacebuilding is supposed to create 
hybrid peace with local ownership and to answer to the needs of the local civil society actors, it brings 
about a positive peace defined according to Western norms that may rule out the local subjects’ needs 
(pp. 115-116). 
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This study analyses ‘the local’ from another perspective than that of peacebuilding. It examines the 
local conceptualisations of violence and dialogue in Burundi’s political crisis by studying the conflict 
narratives by politically active Burundians. 
Although ‘the local’ is usually defined in geographical terms, I give it an extended, national definition 
in this study. I define ‘the local’ as the whole Burundian national community, including both those 
Burundians who live in Burundi and those who are part of the diaspora residing outside the country. 
Even though the diaspora members live abroad, they still maintain ties to their home country and are 
in contact with locally based Burundians. At the end of the thesis, I briefly discuss the differences 
between the discourses present in Burundi and in the diaspora.  
Although this study does not attempt to generalise or to encompass all the aspects of the current 
conflict, a better knowledge of the Burundian situation in general would facilitate the understanding 
of the conflict dynamics of the whole Great Lakes Region and of other African political conflicts. It 
would also help to analyse the shortcomings of peacebuilding. Furthermore, I argue that the alarming 
humanitarian situation of Burundi requires more global attention. By examining the current political 
crisis as one of its causes, this thesis contributes to those needs. 
Before introducing the research focus and aims of this thesis I will describe the dynamics of the 
current political crisis in Burundi and the peace mediation process that has aimed at finding a solution 
to it. I will also review previous research that has been completed on the current political crisis until 
now. 
 
1.1. The political crisis of 2015–17 
Burundi’s current political crisis began in April 2015 when CNDD-FDD’s Pierre Nkurunziza, the 
incumbent president since 2005, announced that he would run for a third term in the July 2015 
election. The major opposition parties pointed out that the move was anti-constitutional and called 
for an electoral boycott. After that people started street protests in the capital Bujumbura that were 
repressed by the police forces. According to different sources, 58–80 people were killed in the protests 
between April and July 2015. (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 4; FIDH, 2016, p. 27; 
Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2015, pp. 212–213) 
On 13 May 2015, army officers led by General Godefroid Niyombare launched a coup attempt while 
the president was attending a summit on the Burundi crisis in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attempt 
failed but caused damage to the Burundian media. Furthermore, the government closed five of the 
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country’s private radio stations, two of which were later allowed to reopen. (Daley & Popplewood, 
2016, p. 648; Reporters Without Borders, 2015, 2016) 
Many opposition candidates boycotted the presidential, parliamentary and local elections that were 
held after a short postponement during the summer 2015. In July 2015, Nkurunziza was re-elected 
with 69 percent of the votes, with FNL’s Agathon Rwasa as his only contender. 
(Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2015, pp. 212–213; Jones & Wittig, 2016, p. 206) 
An NGO report, refuted by the Burundian government, estimates that 1 000 people have died, 8 000 
been detained for political reasons, 300–800 disappeared and hundreds tortured since the beginning 
of the political crisis (FIDH, 2016, p. 21). UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has been able to verify 564 executions between April 2015 and September 2016, the majority of their 
victims being opposants of Nkurunziza's third mandate (UNHRC, 2016, p. 7). Because of the crisis 
that still continues at the time of writing of this study, 413 600 Burundians have fled the country, 
including journalists, civil society leaders and members of the opposition (UNHCR, 2017, May 11). 
As a political reaction, the US and the EU have put in place sanctions against Burundian individuals 
and the EU has cut direct funding for Burundi’s government (Guardian, 2016; O’Kane, 2016). The 
African Union decided to impose sanctions as well but its decision has not been implemented (Crisis 
Group, 2016). Furthermore, many donors have stopped their aid programmes to Burundi (Söderberg 
Kovacs, 2016). 
The initiatives to intervene in Burundi have not led to concrete action. In January 2016, the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Council discussed a military intervention to Burundi under the name 
MAPROBU. The Burundian government rejected any intervention, warning that it would fight 
against such a force, and the AU finally decided to only send an official delegation to Burundi to 
discuss the inclusive Inter-Burundian dialogue. Another AU initiative to deploy 200 human rights 
and military observers has not been fully implemented. At the UN level, the Special Envoy to Burundi 
Jamal Benomar tried to negotiate with the Burundian government about sending in 280 unarmed UN 
police officers as agreed by the Security Council Resolution 2303 in July 2016. The government 
rejected the resolution and it has not been put into practice. (Security Council Report, 2017; UN News 
Centre, 2016; Williams, 2016) 
The central point of disagreement in the political crisis is the interpretation of the amount of terms 
that a president can serve. The Burundian Constitution states that the president “is elected by universal 
direct suffrage for a mandate of five years, renewable once” (Burundi Const., Art. 96). The Arusha 
Agreement that brought an end to the Burundian Civil War, on the other hand, limits the president’s 
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mandate to two five-year terms and states that “no one may serve for more than two presidential 
terms”. Nkurunziza was elected by the Parliament, not by direct suffrage, in the 2005 election and 
therefore he claims that he has the right to seek office once more. There has been opposition to 
Nkurunziza’s third mandate even within his own party CNDD-FDD from which many civilians and 
intellectuals have defected and gone into exile during the crisis. (Jones & Wittig, 2016, p. 206; Wittig, 
2016, p. 150) 
The legal argument that the Burundian government is making to justify the third term is uncommon 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Grauvogel, 2016, p. 11). The Constitutional Court of Burundi approved 
Nkurunziza’s right to seek a third term in May 2015. The decision came under criticism when the 
court’s vice president, who had fled to Rwanda before the ruling, pointed out that its judges had been 
pressured and threatened to approve the third term. (Al Jazeera, 2015; Daley & Popplewood, 2016, 
p. 648) 
The question of a third presidential mandate has recently been subject to debate in several African 
countries and the issue has received wide attention from both the media and scholars. The constitution 
has been amended to remove the limitation of two terms inter alia in Algeria, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Uganda (Anyaeze, 2016, p. 531). Two of 
Burundi’s neighbours, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, have gone through third-term 
debates. The DRC’s President Kabila agreed not to seek a third term after two years of political unrest 
and mediated talks in the end of 2016, whereas the Rwandan President Paul Kagame decided to run 
for a third term in 2017 after a referendum enabled him to stay in power theoretically until 2034 
(BBC, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
 
1.2. Regional mediation without results 
The formal dialogue on the Burundian crisis has been taking place on two levels: in regional 
mediation and in national inter-Burundian talks. The internal process, labelled Inter-Burundian 
dialogue, has been organised by a national commission established by the government. The aim of 
the commission has been to gather views on the political crisis from ordinary Burundians and civil 
society organisations in different parts of the country. The process has been criticised for presenting 
only one side of the opinions (see sub-section 4.2.1.). 
On the other hand, the mediated talks have been led by the regional organisation East African 
Community. It first tried to open the dialogue on a high level with multiparty talks led by the Ugandan 
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President Yoweri Museveni in December 2015 but the talks ended without any concrete outcome. 
(Söderberg Kovacs, 2016) 
In March 2016, the former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa was appointed as the new EAC 
facilitator for the mediation process. Since then, several rounds of talks have been organised in 
Arusha, Tanzania. Mkapa’s approach has been to try to invite a broad range of participants to the 
talks, including civil society, women, youth and religious group representatives. However, the talks 
have been hindered by opposition boycotts and the government’s refusal to talk to some opposition 
groups, such as the CNARED alliance that it has labelled as an armed group. (Söderberg Kovacs, 
2016, Wolters, 2016) 
In December 2016, Mkapa visited Burundi’s capital Bujumbura and presented a roadmap for the 
dialogue process with the objective of reaching an agreement by June 2017. However, the opposition 
alliance CNARED announced that it denied Mkapa’s competence as facilitator, accusing him of 
taking the side of Nkurunziza by legitimising his presidency. (RFI, 2016b) 
In March 2017, the government and opposition still had not entered into negotiations and Mkapa was 
asking for a regional summit to be organised for that purpose (AFP, 2017). Therefore I argue that 
there is a deadlock in the Burundian crisis between the government and the opposition. 
 
1.3. Previous research 
Little research has been done so far on the post-2015 political crisis in Burundi. Most of the research 
has been descriptive briefing papers, reports, conference syntheses and blog posts about the events of 
the political crisis and about the reactions of the international community. This is natural since 
analysing an ongoing crisis is difficult and the picture incomplete as the conflict dynamics change 
continuously. Nevertheless, there has already been analysis of the causes of the crisis. 
Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) from the NGO Search for Common Ground explain the beginning of 
the current crisis with the structural challenges that have not been solved despite the peacebuilding 
efforts, including an unfinished security sector reform. Participants of a conference on Burundi’s 
post-election situation argued that the international community wanted to see a success story in the 
post-civil war Burundi instead of supporting real conflict transformation, which has led to a culture 
of tolerated impunity (Grauvogel, 2016). Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) further argue that the 
international community’s interest towards Burundi has faded, due to which there has been a decrease 
in projects supporting democratic governance and political cooperation. 
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Violence has been present in Burundi for a long time. Daley and Popplewell (2016), Reyntjens (2016) 
and Van Acker (2015) assert that the former rebel groups, including the now ruling party CNDD-
FDD, did not truly adhere to the principles of the 2000 Arusha Agreement. According to them, 
CNDD-FDD has put in place a system of political violence and human rights violations since its 
coming to power in 2005. Van Acker and Reyntjens also point out a phenomenon of militarisation in 
Burundian politics created both by the CNDD-FDD and some armed political opposition groups. 
The lack of economic growth is another key factor explaining the political crisis. Daley and 
Popplewell (2016) indicate political exclusion, economic marginalisation and the rising cost of living 
as explaining factors behind some of the frustrations in the Burundian society. Jobbins and Ahitungiye 
(2015) assert that the political patronage and state capture by elites have led to the stagnation of the 
economy. Van Acker (2015) also argues that the political patronage has led to the political exclusion 
of those who do not support CNDD-FDD. 
Daley and Popplewell (2016) posit that there are some warning signs of ethnicity becoming a dividing 
issue in the political crisis. The Tutsi have been marginalised in power positions by the current Hutu-
led government and on the other hand, some Hutu in the political elite have suspicions of the Tutsi. 
On the contrary, Daley and Chemouni (2015) argued right after the beginning of the crisis that ethnic 
contradictions had lost relevance and that divisions inside the parties were more prominent in 
Burundian politics. Nevertheless, they added that the Tutsi could become a scapegoat in the crisis. 
Ethnicity as a background factor in the conflict is further addressed in section 2.1. 
Wilén (2016a) examined the roles of the neighbouring states in the Burundian crisis in an article 
published in the winter 2016. According to her, the flow of Burundian refugees to Rwanda had 
polished the image of Rwanda as a stable refugee-receiving country in the international community’s 
eyes. The same phenomenon had put pressure on Tanzania which already hosts 200 000 Burundian 
refugees from an earlier crisis in 1972. Wilén predicted spillover effects in the neighbouring countries 
in form of the perpetuation of autocratic leadership and problems in regional relations if the issues of 
autocracy and violence in Burundi were not addressed. 
There has also been recent research on the impact of Burundi’s private radio stations and their 
situation in the post-electoral crisis. Frère (2016) argues that Nkurunziza’s election victory in July 
2015 lacks credibility because the independent radio stations could not cover the election since the 
government had suspended them and they had been attacked in April and May. She adds that the 
international donors were unable to protect the media. Frère further asserts that the independent media 
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have informed Burundians about their democratic rights and thus had an influence on the emergence 
of the anti-government demonstrations of spring 2015. 
There is one recent study on Burundians’ narratives, from the point of view of mobility. Purdeková 
(2017) examines Burundians refugees’ and IDPs’ narratives on displacement in a study conducted 
through ethnographic interviews two years before and during the beginning of the current crisis. She 
argues that the Burundian government attributed the outflow of refugees in the spring and summer 
2015 to non-political factors, first framing it as people fleeing peace, then as fleeing hunger, and 
finally as a phenomenon based on “unfounded fear” and “rumours” (p. 19). She concludes that on the 
contrary, structural insecurity and historical experiences of violence in addition to the immediate 
threats caused the refugee situation and behind it lies the state’s inability and lack of will to protect 
its citizens (p. 20). 
As this chapter has elaborated, the research on the post-2015 period of violence in Burundi until now 
has mostly focused on general analysis of the conflict factors and its possible consequences. What 
has been missing from the research until now is the voice of the local actors, except in one study on 
refugees and IDPs. The dialogue process during the current period of political tension has not yet 
been analysed at all by researchers, so my study provides a fresh point of view for analysing the 
political crisis. 
 
1.4. Research aims: Dialogue and violence narratives 
The aim of this Master’s thesis is to investigate the local conceptualisations of dialogue and violence-
related narratives in the context of the current political crisis in Burundi. The thesis elucidates how 
Burundian government, civil society and opposition actors as well as other politically active 
Burundians conceptualise the conflict and legitimise their positions as well as how they conceive of 
the dialogue on the conflict issues. The aim is to analyse views by Burundians living in Burundi as 
well as by those belonging to the diaspora. 
Conflict events are not objective facts that can be reported as one single truth. On the contrary, 
language in the form of discourses creates the reality and narratives are the units of discourse through 
which people make sense of the reality. Conceptualisations of violence mean the ways in which the 
conflict parties interpret the ongoing violence as well as the issues that they identify as the causes of 
the conflict and as solutions for it. By analysing conflict narratives with discourse analysis I aim to 
point out the issues that the parties disagree on. These are also the issues to which they refer in order 
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to legitimise their positions. I will address the methodological tools of discourse and narrative analysis 
in Chapter 3. 
My study also examines the types of dialogue that the conflict parties aim for and the ways in which 
they qualify the dialogue or the lack of it in the current situation. Dialogue is a term that has been 
used in a variety of ways in international contexts and therefore lacks clarity. In this study, I have 
stayed open to all the forms of interaction that the Burundian conflict parties have understood as 
dialogue. 
The parties’ understanding of the reasons of the conflict, of the solutions for it and the 
conceptualisations of dialogue are all interconnected issues. The discrepancies in these narratives and 
conceptualisations of the situation are what creates tension in the conflict. My aim is to understand 
what on the level of discourses explains the current political deadlock in Burundi. 
The main concepts that constitute the theoretical framework of my study are radical disagreement 
and structuration. I use Ramsbotham’s theory of radical disagreement to examine the clash of 
discourses between the government, opposition and civil society about the core issues of the political 
crisis. Giddens’s structuration theory helps to analyse the discourses on violence by the conflict 
parties. The theoretical framework is explained in the section 4.2. 
The aim of my research is to be a pioneering specific case study. Therefore, it does not aim to provide 
generalisations about the conflict or to compare it to other contexts. 
 
1.5. Justification 
My thesis contributes to the scarce body of research literature on Burundi. The country has lately 
been ignored by many international organisations and few researchers have been doing fieldwork 
there due to a lack of funding and a fear of repression (E. Féron, personal communication, April 15, 
2016; Grauvogel, 2016, p. 6). 
My research creates new information on the dialogue process and the local legitimisation and 
conceptualisation of the post-electoral violence in Burundi in 2015–17. The study gives some insight 
into the current political climate in this small East African country that has been targeted by many 
peacebuilding actors but on which there is little recent research. 
The analysis may be useful for the non-governmental organisations that do peacebuilding in Burundi 
when they evaluate whether their programmes and practices suit the local context. The results of the 
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study may also be relevant for these organisations, other actors that operate in Burundi and for the 
general public that wants to understand better the current political situation and its roots. The study 
also paves way for future research on the dialogue process and the dynamics of political conflict in 
Burundi by suggesting new topics that should be studied further. 
 
1.6. Research question 
In the context of the tense political climate of the years 2015–2017, this thesis analyses the narratives 
and conceptualisations that the Burundian government, opposition and civil society actors have used 
when they have discussed violence and dialogue. More broadly, the study is interested in the ways in 
which politically active Burundians have justified their interpretations of the nature of the political 
crisis in the country. 
My main research question is the following: 
How do the conceptualisations of violence and dialogue that the Burundian opposition, civil 
society and government have presented during the post-electoral crisis of 2015–17 differ and how 
do these discrepancies in narratives explain the current tense political situation in Burundi? 
There are six more specific sub-research questions which examine different categories related to the 
main research question: 
How have the Burundian conflict parties conceptualised the violence in Burundi? 
What kind of narratives have they presented on the legal and political aspects of the conflict? 
How have they conceptualised the question of ethnicity in the conflict? 
How have they discussed economy in the conflict? 
What implications have the different conflict narratives had for the conceptualisations of 
dialogue? 
Do the discrepancies in narratives by the conflict actors constitute radical disagreements and 
how do they explain the current tense political situation in Burundi? 
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2. Background: History, ethnicity and the actors of the crisis 
 
Burundi’s recent history has been characterised by periods of stability that outbreaks of violent 
conflict have regularly interrupted. In this chapter I will provide a chronological overview of the post-
colonial history of Burundi from the point of view of ethnicity and violence as cross-cutting concepts. 
I will first address the role and nature of ethnicity in Burundi’s violent events, then proceed to 
describing the civil war of the 1990s and then present the political evolvements since the 2000 Arusha 
Agreement. At the end of the chapter I will present some of the dynamics of the current conflict which 
require closer examination. This chapter is simultaneously an overview of relevant literature related 
to discourses of violence and the Burundian conflict context. 
 
2.1. Burundi's history of inter-ethnic conflict 
Burundi is composed of two main ethnic groups: the Hutu and the Tutsi, and a small Twa minority. 
Putting the question in simple terms, the German and Belgian colonisers reinforced the polarisation 
between the majoritarian Hutu and the minoritarian Tutsi by favouring the latter in administration 
and education. 
After Burundi’s independence in 1962 Tutsi-led governance continued and the growing frustration 
of the Hutu led to further inter-group tensions. Massacres broke out five times in 1965, 1972, 1988, 
1991 and 1993. Most of these followed the pattern of Hutu rebels attacking Tutsi and Tutsi military 
troops violently counter-attacking. The 1972 killings were the most violent of these massacres, killing 
an estimated 300 000 Burundians, mostly educated Hutu, and forcing several hundreds of thousands 
to flee inside or out of the country. In 1988, Hutu farmers first killed about 3 000 Tutsi and the ensuing 
army reprisal caused the death of 20 000 Hutu in two northern communes. (Falch & Becker, 2008, p. 
1-2; Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2015, p. 207; Uvin, 1999, pp. 258–259) 
 
2.1.1. The complicated question of ethnicity 
According to estimations 84–85 % of Burundians are ethnically Hutu, 14–15 % Tutsi and 1 % Twa, 
a composition very similar to Burundi’s neighbour Rwanda. However, Lemarchand (1994) 
challenged this as what he calls “dogmatic distortions” and claims that these statistics do not recognise 
the Ganwa with princely origins, people with a mixed background, immigrants and the amount of 
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Hutu who were killed or left Burundi as refugees as a consequence of the massacres from 1965 to 
1991. There is also a considerable amount of mixed marriages, especially between Hutu men and 
Tutsi women, as a result of which the children gain the ethnicity of the father but can easily change 
it. (pp. 6–9) 
According to Lemarchand (1994), it has not been the ethnic identity that has traditionally determined 
the hierarchy in the Burundian society, but the social status and the categories of Hutu and Tutsi have 
been mutually inclusive. The social connotation of Hutu has been that of a “social subordinate” and 
therefore a culturally Tutsi person would be identified as Hutu in a client-patron relation where the 
Tutsi is in an inferior position. All in all, the hierarchy within the Hutu and Tutsi is much more 
complicated and nuanced than one would assume. (pp. 9–10) 
Falch and Becker (2008) argue that the Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Burundi are explained by inter-group 
inequality and a struggle for power in a poor country rather than by pure ethnic rivalry (p. 1). 
Ndikumana (2005) agrees, stating that ethnicity was not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but 
became instrumentalised along with other political and regional factors for pursuing political and 
economic power (p. 415). 
As Vandeginste (2014) notes, historical narratives have been used by actors representing one or the 
other ethnic group to justify their claims in both Burundi and Rwanda (p. 2). However, ethnicity is 
discussed in the Burundian society in a very different way than in Rwanda where ethnic and other 
potentially divisive factors are omitted in the Constitution since the genocide of 1994 (p. 7). On the 
contrary, Burundians talk about ethnicity openly, which became clear during the interviews that I 
conducted with members of the Burundian diaspora in Brussels. The openness about ethnicity is 
apparent for example in elections since the ethnicity of the candidates is mentioned in the electoral 
lists, although not in the voters’ cards or identity cards more generally (Frère, 2009, p. 339; 
Vandeginste, 2014, p. 4). 
 
2.1.2. Historical discourses of violence 
The conceptualisations of violence in Burundi have been previously described best by René 
Lemarchand (1994) with regard to the discourses emerging from the 1972 and 1988 massacres. He 
writes in his book Ethnocide as a Discourse and Practice about the concept of meta-conflict about 
how the Burundian conflict parties have historically “perceived, explained and mythologised” the 
actual ethnic conflict in terms of ethnicity, cultural differentiation and history (pp. 17–18). 
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Lemarchand (1994) uses Liisa Malkki’s concept of mythico-histories in explaining how each ethnic 
group used a combination of facts and fictive aspects to justify how it interpreted the conflict. He 
argues that cognitive dissonance was an explaining factor in the discrepancies between the 
interpretations: 
Thus emerges a narrative strategy that is also a discourse in the service of ethnic interests. Interpretations 
of violence tend to pave way for the next foreseeable step, when violence itself becomes a mode of 
discourse. (p. 19) 
 
Lemarchand distinguishes four historical myths behind the interpretations of violence. The first one, 
prominent among exiled Hutu refugees, is based on a belief in historical juxtapositions, according to 
which the Hutu saw the Tutsi as Hamitic invaders who enslaved the Hutu. The second myth is that 
the Hutu-Tutsi tensions were completely introduced by European colonisers, although Lemarchand 
argues that the Belgian colonisation rather divided princely Ganwa factions and only reshaped ethnic 
divisions, creating conflict potential. Thirdly, many Hutu have believed in a myth of the 1972 killings 
being part of a conspiracy plot by the Tutsi. The fourth myth, often present in Tutsi and official 
discourses about the 1972 and 1988 massacres, is that the killings were an external plot by Belgium 
or Rwanda. (pp. 19–30) 
 
2.2. The Burundian Civil War 
The events that led to the outbreak of civil war in Burundi began after a democratic transition process 
was initiated by President Pierre Buyoya from the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party. A democratic 
election in June 1993 resulted in the victory of the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU party and the 
inauguration of Burundi's first Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye. His party got 80 % of the seats in 
the National Assembly, which brought an end to the traditional Tutsi domination in Burundian 
politics. Some believe that this sudden power shift was the reason for the coup attempt by the military 
of the FAB in October 1993, as a result of which President Ndadaye was assassinated and killings of 
Tutsi and Hutu started in different parts of the country. Some define these killings as a genocide. 
(Falch & Becker, 2008, pp. 3, 6-7; Uvin, 2009, p. 12, Vandeginste, 2014, p. 4) 
After a short break in killings the violence broke out again in June 1994, a point which can be defined 
as the start of the Burundian Civil War. It was a guerrilla-type of war that lasted almost 15 years, 
opposing the Tutsi-dominated government army and radical Hutu rebel groups, the main ones being 
CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu-FNL and Frolina. The war was characterised by violence against civilians 
by both sides, human rights violations and impunity (Falch & Becker, 2008, pp. 6–7). 
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The first peace mediation attempt to end the Civil War was led by the UN Special Envoy Ould-
Abdallah and led to the signing of an agreement called the Convention of Government in September 
1994. However, this political agreement was not successful since the fighting continued. (Falch & 
Becker, 2008, pp. 11, 13). 
In 1996, a coup d’état by the Burundian Army brought Pierre Buyoya from UPRONA back to power. 
As a consequence, the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative’s member countries Tanzania, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Zambia imposed sanctions on Burundi. (Wodrig & Grauvogel, 
2016, pp. 275, 279) 
However, the peacebuilding attempts by regional actors in 1996 were met with local resistance. The 
planned regional humanitarian intervention was rejected by both the Burundian ruling Tutsi elite and 
radical Hutu groups that instead insisted on a domestic solution to the situation. This national debate 
involved the major political parties, public officials and civil society groups but armed groups were 
left aside the negotiation table. (Wodrig & Grauvogel, 2016, pp. 278–282) 
Wodrig and Grauvogel (2016) argue that the regional and local elites conceptualised the conflict in 
different ways that both simplified its complexity and “talked past each other”, meaning that they did 
not have any common ground in their visions on peacebuilding. Consequently, a regionally led 
peacebuilding project to bring an end to Burundi’s Civil War did not take place. (pp. 282–284) 
 
2.3. Arusha Agreement and the power-sharing model 
The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement can be conceived as the most important 
political agreement during Burundi’s recent history and is frequently referred to in the current 
political debate. This power-sharing agreement was achieved after negotiations that took two years 
and involved much more parties than the agreement of 1994. Altogether 17 political parties, the 
government and the National Assembly negotiated under mediation by Nelson Mandela. However, 
the main rebel groups PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD refused to sign the agreement and it 
became a peace agreement without a ceasefire. After the Arusha Agreement the Civil War between 
the government and the rebel groups continued at levels of varying intensity until May 2008. (Falch 
& Becker, 2008, pp. 15–20) 
In the 2004 Power-Sharing Agreement Burundi adopted an ethnic power-sharing model that reflects 
the ideas of the 2000 Arusha Agreement (Falch & Becker, 2008, p. 22–23). The Constitution written 
14 
 
the following year introduced a permanent ethnic quota system that Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) 
describe as unique so far in Africa (p. 208). 
Most importantly, the National Assembly and the government are required to be composed of 60 % 
Hutu and 40 % Tutsi. A co-optation system guarantees this if the election outcome does not respect 
the ethnic balance. One of the two vice-presidents needs to be a Hutu and the other a Tutsi, and the 
same requirement is set to the two senators elected from each province. Furthermore, the 2005 
Constitution determined a 50–50 ethnic balance in the army, the police and the intelligence services. 
However, it needs to be noted that the Twa minority does not have a percentage representation and 
has only a co-optation of three seats in the General Assembly and the Senate. (Falch & Becker, 2008, 
p. 22–23; Vandeginste, 2014, pp. 6–7) 
Vandeginste (2015a) states that the biggest achievement of Burundi’s ethnic power-sharing model is 
that it has “prevented electoral violence from transforming into ethnic violence” (p. 636). 
 
2.4. The rise of CNDD-FDD in the 2005 and 2010 elections 
A key point in the recent political history of Burundi is the general election of 2005 which was 
generally considered free and fair and resulted in the victory of the CNDD-FDD party. The former 
rebel group had gradually transitioned into a political party after the 2000 Arusha Agreement, 
including also Tutsi into its structure. However, the opposition and civil society accused it of tactics 
of intimidation and direct violence against voters and opposition actors. (Vandeginste, 2011, p. 316; 
Wittig, 2016, p. 149) 
As was mentioned in the section 1.1., the Parliament elected Pierre Nkurunziza as president in 2005. 
That year marked the start of CNDD-FDD’s period of reign which continues until today. 
In 2010, presidential, legislative and communal elections were held, the presidential election being 
the first direct one since 1993. The opposition parties boycotted all the elections except the communal 
ones, leaving Pierre Nkurunziza of CNDD-FDD as the only presidential candidate who then won the 
election. A coalition of 11 opposition parties accused CNDD of fraud in the local elections but 
external observers considered them free and fair. During the ensuing post-electoral violence political 
figures were assassinated, government and opposition members conducted reprisal attacks and many 
opposition leaders fled from Burundi. (Jones & Wittig, 2016, p. 207; Vandeginste, 2011, pp. 319-
320; Wittig, 2016, p. 150) 
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The CNDD-FDD-led government has emphasised Burundi’s sovereignty and been cautious about 
foreign interference in the country’s affairs – a theme that I will analyse in the sub-section 4.4.2. The 
United Nations Mission to Burundi, BINUB, which was set up in 2006, was reduced to a ten times 
smaller operation called BNUB in 2011 following the government’s demands to the UN to cut its 
presence (Wilén & Chapaux, 2011, p. 539). 
 
2.5. Parties of the current conflict 
Burundi’s current political crisis is the most recent period of violence in Burundi’s long history of 
inter-ethnic and political conflict that was outlined above. Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s definition 
of armed conflict is the following: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government 
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP, 2014). The current 
violence has been going on since April 2015 at varying levels of intensity. Taking into account the 
564 verified executions between 25 April 2015 and 30 August 2016, the official figure of 87 casualties 
during the 11 December 2015 attacks by armed groups on military camps in and around Bujumbura 
and the following army reprisals, Burundi’s political crisis can be defined as an armed conflict. 
(UNHRC, 2016, p. 7–8) 
The parties of Burundi’s armed conflict are on one side the government, including its army Force de 
défense nationale, the police and the intelligence service SNR; and on the other side various armed 
opposition groups of which FNL, RED-Tabara and FOREBU are the most important. Both sides have 
committed acts of violence but a UN investigation has attributed the majority of them to the security 
forces and the Imbonerakure militia. (IRIN, 2016; UNHRC, 2016, p. 7) 
FNL is the ex-rebel movement PALIPEHUTU’s military wing, which still operates in RDC, but its 
leader Agathon Rwasa decided to leave the armed resistance and to engage in politics as the leader 
of an opposition party with the same name. He was appointed as the first vice-president of the 
Parliament after the 2015 election. RED-Tabara and FOREBU are armed groups fighting against 
Nkurunziza, of which the latter is composed of former officers of the security forces and the 2015 
coup leader Godefroid Niyombare. (IRIN, 2016; RFI, 2016c) 
Imbonerakure is the youth league of the ruling party CNDD-FDD that was created during the Civil 
War and is composed mostly of unemployed youth (Wittig, 2016, pp. 149, 152). It is officially a 
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political movement but its members have been accused on several accounts of participating in the 
repression of opponents of Nkurunziza’s third mandate (FIDH, 2016, pp. 148–149). 
What comes to the political scene, most of the opposition parties in exile formed in 2014 an alliance 
called CNARED that the government refuses to accept as a negotiation partner (see section 1.2). It 
operates in exile in Belgium and, as of February 2017, consisted of approximately 20 opposition 
parties, including MSD, UPRONA and FRODEBU, and four former vice-presidents of Burundi were 
part of it (Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, CNARED spokesman, 2.2.2017). 
Burundi’s party system is complicated partly because of the system of nyakurisation in which the 
CNDD-FDD party creates a satellite wing inside an opposition party to support the party in power. 
There is a wide range of opposition parties and some of them have ties to the armed rebel groups 
while some do not, but it is difficult to get verifiable information about the links. (FIDH, 2016, pp. 
121, 149–151) 
A Brussels-based Burundian journalist described the phenomenon in the following way: 
Since the second mandate [of Pierre Nkurunziza], even before, CNDD-FDD prepared the elections, 
prepared the third mandate by dividing the parties. The opposition parties, the majority of parties have been 
divided. – – They sent in CNDD-FDD activists, or then they aroused a division inside the party to put in 
place organisms, people in the opposition party with whom they will collaborate. 
(Interview of a Burundian journalist, 1.2.2017) 
 
The civil society is described in the following section. At its end, I will define the conflict parties of 
the Burundian political crisis in terms of this study. 
 
2.6. The Burundian diaspora and civil society 
The role of the diaspora is influential in the Burundian politics and the current crisis. Therefore, I 
describe the Burundian diaspora here briefly, focusing on the diaspora in Belgium which 
accommodates the largest number of Burundians outside Africa (Turner & Brønden, 2011, p. 6). The 
majority of diaspora scholars define diasporas as having at least two countries of destination, 
maintaining a relationship to their home country and being consciously aware of a common national 
or ethnic identity (Butler, 2011, p. 192). I apply this definition to this study but consider that a diaspora 
can also mean a part of a diaspora residing in a specific country. 
Due to colonial ties Belgium is home to a considerable number of Burundians, although the size of 
the diaspora is difficult to estimate because the Belgian institutions do not possess exact figures on 
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the size of nationality groups (Siréas, 2004, p. 5). According to OECD statistics, there are about 
10 000 Burundians altogether living in OECD countries (Turner & Brønden, 2011, p. 6). 
In fact, rather than one single diaspora, there are several Burundian diasporas since the groups in exile 
are heterogeneous and fragmented. Those who fled the outbursts of violence in Burundi at different 
times since the 1972 massacres and those who left to study in Europe in the 1980s were mostly Hutu, 
and these different diaspora groups are fairly separated. There are also Tutsi diaspora groups. The 
communities in exile in Europe are very politicised, especially the younger generations. The Hutu 
diasporas have acted as critical watchdogs, providing alternative information to that spread by the 
government and trying to lobby the international community. Some of the Hutu returned or partly 
returned to Burundi after the 2000 Arusha Agreement, taking up positions in the government. Those 
who arrived in the 1970s tend to be integrated into the European societies and more disconnected 
from what is happening in Burundi. According to Turner and Brønden, the diaspora members tend to 
form opinions that are detached from what is happening in Burundi. (Turner & Brønden, 2011) 
The Burundian civil society in exile in Belgium can be divided into two parts: cultural and political. 
The cultural civil society includes for example associations dealing with traditions, dance and 
solidarity. What comes to the political civil society, there have traditionally been some associations 
working for Burundi’s development and restructuration, whereas during the political crisis of 2015–
2017, more civil society activists have left for exile in Belgium and the political civil society has 
become more active. (Interview of a Burundian civil society activist, 1.2.2017; Turner & Brønden, 
2011, p. 19) 
There is a lot of internal variety within the Burundian civil society. There are some political civil 
society associations and some solidarity and voluntary work associations which are still active in 
Burundi but have had to submit to the government (Interview of a Burundian civil society 
representative, 1.2.2017). Furthermore, the phenomenon of nyakurisation, discussed above with 
regard to political parties, has expanded to the civil society NGOs. The government has created NGOs 
which are loyal to it and control the activities of the critical human rights NGOs. It has also limited 
the activities of certain human rights NGOs in several ways. (FIDH, 2016, pp. 119, 121–122) 
The politically active civil society that has fled the country has become involved in the CNARED 
opposition alliance in Belgium. This is how a civil society activist describes it: 
There are also civil societies that are advocating for human rights. And it is that civil society that we hear. 
So it – – got, as a matter of fact, opposed to those in power because it criticised the instruments of the 
government. And the government saw this civil society as adversaries. 
(Interview of a Burundian civil society representative, 1.2.2017) 
18 
 
 
The division between the Burundian government, opposition and civil society is not clear due to the 
complicated consequences of nyakurisation and the cooperation between political opposition and 
civil society. In terms of this study, I define the parties in the current political crisis as the government 
and the opposition-civil society camp. The latter includes the opposition that is against the third 
presidential mandate and the politically active civil society in exile, which are both mostly represented 
by the CNARED alliance. In addition, I consider that the independent civil society activists who 
criticise the government belong to the opposition-civil society camp.  
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3. Methodology 
 
This chapter addresses the data gathering process and the methodological tools that I used when I 
conducted my study. I will first describe the types of data that I collected and describe in more detail 
open-ended interviewing which was one of my data collection methods. After that, I will describe the 
way in which I coded the data and the discourse analysis method. The last part of the chapter deals 
more specifically with narratives and narrative analysis as a methodological tool that I used in 
combination with discourse analysis. 
 
3.1. Types of data 
I decided to include both written narratives and interviews in my data in order to get a sufficiently 
broad range of material and to examine the topic as comprehensively as possible. I also thought that 
personal interviews among Burundians in Europe would increase my understanding of the situation 
since I did not have the financial possibility to conduct research on the ground in Burundi. Social 
media was an interesting platform to analyse because of its increasing popularity and the possibilities 
for instantaneous discussion among people in different physical places that it offers. 
 
3.1.1. Social media data 
Burundi is a country where the radio is still the dominant media outlet (Frère, 2013, p. 162). This is 
partly due to the Burundian illiteracy rate of over 60 % (Frère, 2016, p. 140). Internet penetration was 
estimated at 7,2 % and mobile phone penetration at 47 % in June 2016 (CIPESA, 2016, p. 5). The 
level of social media use in Burundi is unknown but in general social media use especially via mobile 
devices is on the rise on the African continent (Pfeiffer, Kleeb, Mbelwa & Ahorlu, 2014, p. 179). This 
suggests that using social media platforms is becoming more popular also among those Burundians 
that have internet access, mostly in the urban areas. 
My primary social media data consists of posts on the political situation on the Facebook pages and 
in the Twitter feeds of prominent Burundian government, civil society and opposition actors. Several 
anti-government activists and government representatives have been active on Twitter during the 
political crisis (CIPESA, 2016, p. 11). Due to the fact that I do not speak Burundi’s national language 
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Kirundi, the data of my study is limited to the discourses by those Burundians who write posts and 
comments in French on social media platforms, including the Burundian elite. 
I also analysed relevant comments under the Facebook posts and replies to the tweets. Analysis of 
these discussions led me further to Twitter feeds and Facebook walls of Burundians who were active 
in the discussions and I included some of their tweets and posts in the data. The nature of narratives 
in social media is discussed later in this chapter (in the sub-section 3.5.2). 
The main source of social media data among the opposition and civil society actors was the Facebook 
page of Pacifique Nininahazwe, a leading Burundian civil society activist. In the government camp, 
I analysed the Twitter feed of Willy Nyamitwe, the Senior Advisor for Media and Communication of 
President Pierre Nkurunziza. I also analysed the Twitter feed and Facebook page of the president 
himself who was most active on Twitter in 2015 and 2016, often publishing several tweets in a row 
constituting a longer statement. One more target of analysis were the posts and the ensuing 
discussions on the journalistic social media platforms SOS Médias Burundi and Burundi Journalistes 
et Société civile. They are sites mixing journalistic and opinion content updated by journalists of the 
private media outlets that were damaged during the coup attempt in April 2015 and by civil society 
activists in Burundi and in the diaspora. 
 
3.1.2. Interviews and other types of data 
I conducted five mainly open-ended interviews among the Burundian diaspora in Belgium in order 
to get some primary data and to gain a better understanding of the context. I will further discuss the 
interviews later in this chapter. 
In order to expand the base of my data I included some excerpts of discourses by civil society actors 
at an Inter-Burundian dialogue session organised by a governmental commission for dialogue in the 
City of Bujumbura on April 13, 2016. These discourses were given in Kirundi and enabled analysing 
Burundi-based civil society representatives’ conceptualisations of the crisis. A Burundian journalist 
based in Brussels kindly offered his help to translate these discourses into French. 
I also used interviews and citations of Burundians in articles by local and international online media 
reporting on Burundi as data. The analysed international media outlets are Radio France 
Internationale, Le Monde and BBC. Some of the local journalists operate on non-conventional 
platforms, such as the Facebook-based SOS Médias Burundi that was already mentioned in the 
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previous sub-chapter. In addition, I collected data from an independent weekly elite newspaper Iwacu 
which is published with an online version in French (Frère, 2016, p. 140).  
In addition, I analysed the narratives in an online TV documentary by France24 called Burundi – à 
visage caché in French and Burundi: Fear in Exile in English, published on January 20, 2017. I took 
both the French and the English version into account in collecting the narratives. 
 
3.1.3. Time range 
I chose the narratives for analysis based on their relevance to my research question. They had to 
include conceptualisations of the ongoing violence and the dialogue. The time range of the data was 
from April 2015 to April 2017. April 2015 was when the protests against President Nkurunziza’s 
third mandate started and April 2017 the latest period possible for the analysis process so that there 
would be as recent data as possible.  
I chose social media narratives from different sources published around the same time and 
commenting on similar issues. For example, data from September and October 2016 was interesting 
since the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi released a report in the end of September 
revealing human rights violations by the Burundian security services which sparked a political debate 
and a denial by the government. The social media data was from April–June and December 2015; 
January, August-September and October 2016; February, March and April 2017. 
 
3.2. Responsive open-ended interviews 
My study aimed to gather conceptualisations and narratives by politically active Burundians. 
Therefore, I considered it necessary to collect some primary accounts from people with knowledge 
about the political crisis. Since it was not economically possible to go for a field trip in Burundi, I 
decided to travel to Belgium in the end of January 2017 for five days to conduct five qualitative 
interviews among the Burundian diaspora. 
I decided to contact the Burundian Embassy in Brussels, a civil society association and the opposition 
alliance CNARED in order to get the points of view of the three groups that my study encompasses: 
the government, the civil society and the opposition. I contacted the embassy by telephone and was 
granted a fixed appointment with one of their diplomats. I sent an e-mail to the civil society 
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association and phoned the CNARED alliance. Their representatives answered positively and asked 
me to contact them once I would have arrived in Brussels. 
Upon arrival, I had some difficulties to reach the CNARED representative for an interview since the 
number that he had used before was now in the use of another representative of the organisation. I 
later found out that the person that I was supposed to interview was in Germany. Instead, I was 
referred to the spokesman of the organisation, managed to reach him and went to do the interview in 
Charleroi where he lived. 
I also called the representative of the civil society association who told me that he was not available 
for a live interview because he lived outside Brussels. Nevertheless, he gave me two contacts: the 
other one a Brussels-based Burundian journalist and the other a former diplomat in Brussels. Finally, 
I also interviewed the civil society representative on the phone. 
Qualitative interviewing attempts to reveal the perceptions and experiences of the interviewees and 
to map their world views so that they can speak about them in their own terms (Patton, 2002, p. 348; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 36). Responsive interviews with open-ended questions aim to discover 
examples, narratives and stories (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 37). Therefore, I chose the approach of 
responsive interviewing for my data gathering process. 
Responsive interviewing focuses on the relationship that the interviewer and interviewee establish 
during their exchange, flexibility in designing the research and the objective of having a profound 
understanding of the issue. The interviewer keeps the questions broad and avoids restricting what the 
interviewee can respond. (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 30, 35, 36) 
On the other hand, the interview guide approach enables the interviewer to lead the interview 
spontaneously and to use a conversational style but in the same time ensures the systematicity of the 
interviews since the topics have been determined beforehand (Patton, 2002, p. 343). I wrote down the 
main questions in an interview protocol that could be given to the interviewees before the interview 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 147). I shared most of my main questions to one of my interviewees, the 
diplomat representing the government, since he asked to see them beforehand. The main interview 
questions are presented in Table 1. I asked them in slightly different ways depending on the situation 
and the interviewees’ answers. 
My interview method was a combination of the two aforementioned approaches. I defined the topics 
of the interviews before conducting them but stayed flexible during the interview process, adapting 
my plan to what came up during the interviews. Moreover, I recorded all of them. 
23 
 
The main interview questions 
How do you describe the events in Burundi since April 2015? 
Why is there violence in Burundi since then? 
What do you think about the situation in Burundi today? 
What types of interaction have there been between the government, the opposition and the civil society 
since April 2015? What kind of exchanges would you like to have? 
Some have spoken about the ethnicisation of the crisis and even about the risk of a genocide. What do 
you think about that? 
What do you think about the reactions and the actions of the international community with regard to the 
political situation? 
What would, be according to you, the essential elements of a political solution to the crisis? 
How did you personally experience the period after the Civil War and the Arusha Agreement? 
Table 1. The main interview questions to the government, opposition and civil society representatives. 
 
Three of the interviews were done anonymously and two without anonymity. I will discuss the 
question of anonymity in the sub-section 3.7.1. The interviewees who preferred to keep their 
anonymity were the diplomat, a middle-aged activist of a civil society association and a young 
journalist working for an independent media. In addition to them, I had among my interviewees Félix 
Ndayisenga, a former diplomat that the government had dismissed from his position, and Pancrace 
Cimpaye, the spokesman of the CNARED opposition alliance. All of the interviewees were men and 
they represented both the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups. 
I interviewed the current diplomat at the Burundian Embassy in Brussels. He had prepared for the 
interview by writing down answers to the pre-sent questions and gave them to me as a text document 
before I started the interview. After the interview I realised that he had answered the questions 
following the written answers, sometimes from word to word. Nevertheless, as I made some follow-
up questions partly based on what I had prepared for and partly improvising, the answers to those and 
the additional questions that I had not sent to him were spontaneous. At the end, the diplomat argued 
that the media are manipulating things and the information presented by them should be combined 
with other sources of information.  
The interview of the journalist took place at his daytime job office, the one of Ndayisenga at a bar 
and the one of Cimpaye at the café of Charleroi’s railway station. The journalist’s interview was 
shorter than the other ones since time was limited and he also translated some civil society video 
speeches for me. Ndayisenga’s interview was the longest and most open-ended, consisting of many 
anecdotes. Therefore, I decided to use it as background information, not as material for the analysis. 
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Cimpaye’s interview was relatively brief and he answered my questions and follow-ups in a 
straightforward manner in which I saw many connections to CNARED’s collective views. 
The telephone interview of the civil society representative was the most technically challenging since 
it was hard to hear his answers completely due to the connection. As a result, I had to base the 
interview mostly on the questions that I had prepared. However, the quality of the recording was 
finally quite good. The interview was long and there was a lot of repetition in it. 
I conducted all the interviews in French, the common language for me and the interviewees. I have 
translated all the examples from the interviews from French to English for this thesis. 
I transcribed all the interviews after I had returned to Finland. The level of precision of the 
transcription depends on how much in detail the analysis is done (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 203–
204). As the interviews were not the only part of my data and I intended to analyse the 
conceptualisations, I decided to write a so-called clean transcript that leaves out repetition and 
utterances without lexical meaning (Elliott, 2005, p. 52).  
However, for the sections of one interview that provided narratives and conceptualisations of specific 
interest to me regarding the research question I decided to use Gee's units of discourse transcription 
technique. It makes salient the rhythm and structure of the speech by breaking the text down into 
lines, each of which composes an idea unit, and poetry-style stanzas that deal with one topic (Elliott, 
2005, pp. 54–55). After concluding that this technique was very time-consuming, I decided to write 
a clean transcript of the rest of the interviews. 
 
3.3. Coding 
Coding was the first phase of the discourse analysis process. Gill (2000) argues that coding for 
discourse analysis is based on the questions of interest that determine the categories (p. 179). 
Following my research question, the objective of the coding process was thus to identify the 
conceptualisations of violence and dialogue in the post-electoral crisis by the Burundian government, 
opposition and civil society actors, as well as who was speaking to whom. 
At the beginning, in the coding phase, my approach to the analysis was inductive, as is often the case 
with the early phases of qualitative analysis. This allowed me to stay open to the data and to the 
categories that emerged from it. (Patton, 2002, p. 453) 
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According to Sundberg and Harbom (2011), a codebook is an important point of reference for the 
researcher to understand the data (p. 105). As there was various material to code – interviews, social 
media posts, videos and news text – I decided to create a systematic codebook (in Appendix 1) that 
listed the categories that I was looking for in the texts. 
I wrote the codebook based on a reading of four out of my five research interviews, those that I had 
identified as including relevant data for the discourse analysis. During the transcription of the 
interviews I had highlighted sections that were of interest regarding my research question. I did a 
second, superficial reading of the transcripts for the codebook. Based on that, I identified categories 
with focus on the following types of information: types of violence; ways of legitimising the action 
taken; reasons and solutions for the conflict; types of dialogue; and social actors. 
I stayed flexible and ready to adapt the categories during the coding process to a sufficient extent, 
while still keeping the process systematic (Sundberg & Harbom, 2011, pp. 97, 102). I added new 
categories to the codebook during the coding process when I found them relevant. 
I considered it relevant to differentiate between actors in diaspora and those in Burundi because the 
context in which they comment on issues is different. I added this detail in the classification matrix 
if it was possible to find it out. 
The classification matrix (in Appendixes 2 and 3) includes five types of information about each 
narrative: the source; the way in which the information is conveyed, such as a Facebook post or a 
comment in a news story; who speaks; to whom the message is intended; and finally the category of 
the conceptualisation. 
 
3.4. Discourse analysis 
There is a widespread tradition of discourse analysis in social sciences, mostly based on Michel 
Foucault’s work. Fairclough (2003) defines discourse as “a particular way of representing some part 
of the (physical, social, psychological) world” (p. 17). Discourses are constituents of social practices 
which partly form actual events, or in other words, social processes define our knowledge of the world 
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 24; Gill, 2000, p. 173). Foucault (1989) also sees discourses as practices that 
are represented by discursive relations (p. 46). Discourse analysis therefore analyses both language 
and society practices (Gee & Handford, 2012, p. 5). 
Discourse analysis was a suitable method for my study since conflicts are essentially about different 
interpretations of the reality which are represented and made salient at the level of language. I will 
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discuss this more in detail in the following chapter about narratives. Discourse analysis helped to 
answer the questions of what divides the Burundian conflict parties and how they talk about dialogue. 
In this study, I use an elaborated version of Fairclough’s and Foucault’s definitions and understand 
discourses both as practices and as ways of representing and conceptualising violence and dialogue 
in the Burundian post-electoral conflict. 
Foucault (1989) argues that a visible discourse is based on what it does not say (p. 25). This implied 
for my research that the things that a discourse omits also had to be analysed. The practice of not 
doing something or leaving something out are discursive practices just as visible discourses are. 
According to Foucault (1989), statements are interrelated events and discourse analysis is concerned 
with determining the conditions on which a statement exists, its limits and correlations with other 
statements that exist before or after it (pp. 28–29). Fairclough (2003) posits that representations 
constitute discourses but not all representations are distinct discourses (p. 124). Finding out whether 
two representations are part of the same discourse requires identifying their similarities and 
differences (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). When one can perceive a regularity between different statements, 
they constitute a discursive formation which is subjected to rules of formation that are its conditions 
of existence (Foucault, 1989, p. 38). 
Fairclough (2003) posits that discourses range from abstract to more specific, which implies that 
different levels of discourses can be distinguished (pp. 125–127). Furthermore, discourses can be 
combined with other, already existing discourses, to form new ones (pp. 126–127). I took this into 
account in the coding process by grouping together categories that were related to the same issue so 
that more specific categories were grouped under a general one. This was done in order to facilitate 
defining the abstract discourses later in the analysis and determining which more specific discourses 
belong to them. 
Gill (2000) describes the actual discourse analysis after the coding phase as firstly finding patterns in 
the data and secondly forming hypotheses based on the functions of specific characteristics of the 
discourses and comparing them to the data (p. 180). Fairclough (2003) states that textual analysis 
includes identifying the main themes, that is the parts of the world represented, and finding out the 
perspective from which the representation is done (p. 129). 
Legitimisation is one of the functions of discourses. People continuously seek to explain and justify 
their actions in social life (Fairclough, 2003, p. 88). The same happens when the conflict parties in 
Burundi justify their positions vis-à-vis the conflict. Van Leeuwen (undated, as cited in Fairclough, 
2003, p. 98) has distinguished different forms of legitimisation such as authorisation, by referring to 
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an institutional authority; rationalisation, by referring to the usefulness of doing something 
institutionalised; moral evaluation, by reference to value systems; and mythopoesis, which means 
using narratives as legitimisation. I assumed that I would find these types of legitimisation in the 
conceptualisations of violence by the conflict parties. Analysing the discrepancies in legitimisation 
was part of the final analysis of the data. 
Furthermore, discourses often include metaphors that can be lexical or grammatical. Lexical 
metaphors are words that connect one representation to another, such as representing a controversial 
suggestion by a conflict party as a red rag to a bull. One type of grammatical metaphor is 
nominalisation – transforming a verb into a noun in order to generalise and to make the phrase more 
abstract so that it is not clear who performs the action (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 129, 143–144). 
My study is also interested in the representations of social actors in the Burundian crisis. Texts can 
represent social actors by excluding, passivating, impersonalising or generalising them among others. 
Exclusion can happen so that a social actor is not present in a text or so that the reader has to infer to 
whom the text refers. Passivating means that the social actor as a subject of others’ actions without 
agency is emphasised, while impersonalising takes away some of their humanness. Generalisation 
refers to social actors as a general group. (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 129, 145–146, 150) 
Van Dijk (2006a) analyses discourses in relation to the structure of ideologies. His concept of 
polarisation between in-groups and out-groups was relevant for my research since it is typical for a 
conflict that a group emphasises its own good actions and the bad actions of the other group. 
Distinguishing who speaks in the narratives and to whom was important in order to identify the 
different groups that participate in narrating the conflict: in the case of this study the government, 
opposition and civil society. It included identifying whose narratives in the social media, traditional 
media and other platforms I analysed, and whom they define as relevant actors in the conflict. I will 
discuss the narrative actors and tellership in social media further in the following chapter. 
 
3.5. Narratives and narrative analysis 
Narratives are stories that the Burundian conflict parties tell in order to understand and conceptualise 
the conflict. My data consists of narratives and conceptualisations inside them. Narrative analysis in 
social media has specific characteristics and I use it to analyse the data on Facebook and Twitter. 
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My interpretation of narrative analysis for this study is that it constitutes a sub-category of discourse 
analysis. I use a combination of the two in my analysis. In this section, I will first present the narratives 
and their analysis and then more specifically narratives in social media. 
 
3.5.1. Analysing narratives 
According to Autesserre’s (2014) definition, narratives are “stories that people create to make sense 
of their lives and environments” and they are in constant interaction with practices or can emerge 
from them (pp. 33–35). Another definition by Czarniawska (2004) defines a narrative as “a spoken 
or written text giving an account of an event/action or series of events/actions, chronologically 
connected” (p. 17). In my study, I use Autesserre’s definition which connects well with the discursive 
notion of practices. 
Möller (2011) complements Autesserre’s and Czarniawska’s definitions by stating that narratives 
reflect what their author or orator views as important or interesting aspects. They provide information 
about the motivations and reasoning of the actors and give a deeper picture of the situation. (pp. 75, 
86) 
Bauman (1986, as cited in Brenneis, 1996, p. 42) has argued that there are “narrative events” and 
“narrated events”, meaning that the narratives both represent the situations in which they are told and 
the past or future events that they describe. The narrated events do not exist prior to a narrative but 
the narratives construct the events that they describe (p. 47). This implies that conflict narratives are 
units of discourse that create knowledge (Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p. 4).  
Sometimes narrative analysis deals with two competing stories about the same issue (Thornborrow, 
2002, p. 57). This is typical for dispute communication in which the parties present discursively their 
interpretations of the interaction between them and of the events leading to the conflict (Stewart & 
Maxwell, 2010, p. 4). When examined in another context, that of a political conflict, these aspects 
refer to the objectives of my study. The conflict parties of the Burundian crisis interpret discursively 
their dialogue and the causes and patterns of the violence. An analysis of the differences in the conflict 
narratives presented by the government, opposition and civil society helps to identify the issues in 
which their positions differ and therefore answers my research question. 
Another feature of conflict narration is that parties try to overcome the narratives of their adversary 
in order to advance their objectives for a conflict outcome. The narratives that are powerful in terms 
of culture or norms become dominant while those challenging them are called counter-narratives 
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(Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, pp. 4, 34–35). Brenneis (1996) refers to the same phenomenon by stating 
that in a conflict one narrative often becomes authoritative (p. 47).  
The question of power and narratives is linked to the discussion on entitlement, the right to tell a 
story. That right is related to the position of the narrator in a community and it is subject to change. 
(Brenneis, 1996, p. 43–44; Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p. 34) 
Due to their nature as tools of power, narratives do not always provide clarity. According to Brenneis 
(1996), conflict narrators are prone to speculate about events that they are not completely familiar 
with. Conflicts also often inflict narratives about possible future outcomes of actions, in other words 
scenarios. (pp. 42–43) 
In my study, I analysed the discourses present in the conflict narratives. A single narrative can include 
several discourses. They can be complementary, contributing to the same representation, or can 
compete with each other – an aspect that I will analyse further in the following section on social 
media narratives. 
In addition, narratives can be primary or secondary sources of which the primary are written or told 
by the actors themselves or by direct observers of the events (Möller, 2011, p. 75). My study is mainly 
interested in primary narratives, for example social media posts and discussions and speeches in the 
national dialogue sessions. In news stories, I analysed citations instead of the interpretations by the 
journalist. However, the interviews are secondary narratives since my interviewees are not directly 
observing the events in Burundi but live in Belgium. 
 
3.5.2. Narratives in social media 
Social media posts and discussions are real-time narratives that put an emphasis on what is happening 
at the moment. Page (2012) analyses them through the concept of narrativity. One of the sub-
categories of this concept is tellership that underlines the collaborative, co-constructed nature of 
social media narration (p. 13). Blum-Kulka (1997, as cited in Thornborrow, 2002, p. 58) labels this 
type of narration ‘polyphonic’. 
A polyphonic narrative has several participants who have different narrative roles. Part of my analysis 
was to identify the social actors present in the narratives that are told by the conflict parties: who is 
talking and to whom? Ochs and Taylor (1992, as cited in Thornborrow, 2002, p. 58) have identified 
introducers, narrators, protagonists, primary recipients, problematisers and problematisees as 
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participants of narration. In this study, I limit my focus to the introducers, narrators and primary 
recipients. 
Page’s understanding of narrativity coincides with the idea of a dialogic and co-authored narrative 
that is based on the semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of multivocality. This school of thought 
posits that narratives can be created in interaction between the narrator and the audience and in that 
process narratives may be commonly created, favoured, rejected or transformed (Stewart & Maxwell, 
2010, pp. 30–31). This describes well the process of social media interaction that may modify the 
original message and shift the discussion to a totally different direction than intended by the one who 
initially made the social media post. This implies for my analysis that a single narrative may include 
several discourses that may be contrary to the discourse originally presented by the initial narrator. 
According to Page (2012), tellership options in social media formats vary from single to multiple 
tellers that compete in contributing to the narrative (p. 196). In the Facebook discussions that my 
study analyses the tellership is multiple and distributed to individual text units that take turns, making 
the tellership reconfigured (p. 197–198). This means that the initial Facebook update is the first unit, 
followed by individual comments made by other Facebook users. All of these combined constitute a 
narrative with multiple tellership. 
On Twitter, other users can reply to individual tweets or retweet them. The tellership is multiple and 
reconfigured but in contrast to Facebook, the tellership in modified retweets is inside one text unit in 
which the original tweet is preceded by a comment. In this reconfigured format the original tweet can 
even be changed or information can be added to the original tweet text. (Page, 2012, p. 198–199) 
Another characteristic of tellership in social media discussions is the control of the text. For example 
on Twitter, the initial teller has control of the narrative in their initial tweet but not in the modified 
retweets, in which the retweeter, the second co-teller, can modify the original text and publish it 
(Page, 2012, p. 197). On the other hand, on Facebook, the original teller retains moderating power as 
he or she can delete the comments that he or she dislikes. The same cannot be done on Twitter where 
unfavourable replies to a tweet can only be reported to the Twitter administrators. 
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3.6. Limitations and validity 
The context of conflict and the low level of freedom of expression1 in Burundi have narrowed the 
space for dissident voices, which has limited the availability of opinions contrary to those of the 
government. This is the case especially in social and traditional media where a lot of the material may 
have been censored or self-censored because of a fear of consequences from the government, as 
illustrated by the following quote. 
There are friends who tell us “please do not even send me this message”. On WhatsApp, you see. They are 
even afraid to receive a message. I say “but you can delete it afterwards but still you receive it, you read it, 
you delete it afterwards”. They say “no no no, I do not even want to receive. Because if I am caught reading 
the message” … that comes from the opposition camp for example, people are afraid to read it, to receive 
it or to listen to it, being in Burundi. 
(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
Criticising the government has mostly been possible for those who are operating in exile outside 
Burundi. Even some of them are cautious about the ways in which they can voice the criticism, but 
there is still more space to express critical opinions outside Burundi than inside. Therefore, I argue 
that the emergence of a variety of opinions, which was possible by gathering accounts both from 
exiled Burundians and for example the Inter-Burundian dialogue participants’ videoed speeches, has 
made the study more comprehensive than it would have been to gather material only from informants 
who remain in Burundi. 
I acknowledge, however, that the exiled Burundians have a different stance and point of view on the 
conflict than those who are based in Burundi and who are first-hand observers of events. As I was not 
able to travel to Burundi due to economic reasons and security risks, I could not gather first-hand 
accounts by interviewing Burundians in the country but had to rely on material available online. 
Due to these limitations caused by the conflict context and the limited access to material and 
informants, my study cannot attempt to generalise about all the different conceptualisations of the 
conflict that Burundians have. It rather provides an analysis of the views that are available under the 
current circumstances. 
Regarding social media, there are some limitations in the material because of the spontaneous nature 
of the platforms. Social media comments are often immediate reactions to events and the writer may 
not have reflected on the issue thoroughly before writing the post. Furthermore, when identifying the 
actors writing comments, I had to rely on the information that could be found in the public profile of 
                                                 
1 For example in the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index 2016 Burundi was listed 80 th out of 100 and in the 
Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom ranking of 2017 the 160th out of 180 countries. Sources: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/burundi, https://rsf.org/en/ranking 
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the writer. It is possible that the profile information is intentionally falsified for various reasons, such 
as personal security. As it is not possible to verify this, I had no other option than to evaluate that 
information on my own. Some profiles also did not have a description of the person’s position or 
background. In that case, I looked at the previous tweets and evaluated into which category I should 
classify the person. There were also non-Burundians commenting on the posts but I excluded them 
from the analysis as my study is concerned with the Burundians’ perceptions of the conflict. 
Öberg and Sollenberg (2011) write about bias in news reports and the inference by the journalist 
regarding ‘soft issues’, such as beliefs or feelings of the conflict parties. They warn that reporting on 
such perceptions is often inaccurate (p. 51). In my study, I analysed comments in news stories to 
examine the conceptualisations and perceptions by the interviewees, so I did not examine the 
journalists’ accounts as such, which helped me avoid such bias. Furthermore, the source itself may 
present facts with a bias with regard to distortion of information, exclusion of certain types of it, and 
bias of the world-view for example by straightforward labelling (Höglund & Öberg, 2011, p. 189). 
This kind of bias was surely included in the research, although again, the research question was related 
to the perceptions and conceptualisations of the conflict, so perceptions were the object of the study 
rather than facts. 
Concerning gender, there is unavoidably a bias in my study since the majority of the informants were 
men. As I mentioned in the section 3.2., all of my interviewees were males. Among the narrators on 
social media and in news articles and among the participants of the Inter-Burundian dialogue sessions, 
whose comments I analysed, there were a few women but the overwhelming majority were men. I 
did not intentionally leave women out of the analysis but did not especially choose publications of 
female narrators either – the data selection was based on the relevance of the themes addressed. 
Burundi’s power-sharing practices outlined in the Constitution require a representation of women in 
the public positions, for instance 30 % of the National Assembly members and ministers should be 
women (Falch & Becker, 2008, p. 23). Nevertheless, men dominate the leading positions of the 
political parties and for example the majority of the board members of the CNARED opposition 
alliance are men. 
Another limitation of my analysis was my cultural competence with Burundi (Neumann, 2008, p. 63). 
I was not very familiar with Burundi when I started planning my study but by reading about the 
country I began to learn about the Burundian context. Knowledge of the Belgian colonial legacy also 
helped to understand some of the external influences on Burundian culture and society and the 
diaspora dimension of Burundi. However, the most helpful thing to understand the context better was 
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doing the five interviews with Burundians. They provided me with a lot of historical information and 
helped to understand the concepts relevant for the people in this East-African country. 
I already mentioned earlier my lack of knowledge of Burundi’s national language Kirundi. However, 
my knowledge of French enabled me to analyse material written in Burundi’s second official 
language2 and to conduct the interviews in a language more familiar to the interviewees than English. 
Translation of concepts from French to English, and from Kirundi to French and then to English in 
the case of the Inter-Burundian dialogue discourses, naturally caused a possibility of losing aspects 
in translation. As a result, the entirety of the discursive nuances could not be conveyed in the final 
analysis. 
However, considering the lack of current research on Burundi, I felt that it was necessary to do 
conduct the study despite the linguistic and cultural limitations. Alongside the translation help that I 
received, I considered my cultural and linguistic competences good enough in order to produce a 
valid, although not perfect, study. 
 
3.7. Ethics and positionality 
 
3.7.1. Anonymity and ethical concerns 
I decided to give anonymity to those of my interviewees that requested it, three out of five. Talking 
about issues related to political conflicts is in general sensitive and risky for people who are engaged 
in activities against an authoritarian government. In the Burundian case, the post-electoral violence 
has forced many members of the country’s opposition, civil society and journalists to flee and they 
are afraid of facing violence or death threats. According to a report by the human rights NGO FIDH 
(2016), members of civil society, especially human rights defenders, and journalists have been 
increasingly harassed and stigmatised since 2015 (pp. 117, 119). These findings have been confirmed 
by other studies. 
Due to these risks, it was necessary to grant anonymity to those of my interviewees who wanted to 
have it. However, two interviewees did not require anonymity, saying that they are acting openly or 
that they have little to lose. This supports my understanding that most of the politically active 
                                                 
2 Burundi recently adopted English as a third official language for the purposes of integration within the East African 
Community but French remains as the most widely used European language (Uwimana, 2014). 
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Burundians that adhere to civil society organisations or opposition parties are aware of the danger 
that they might face and have made a conscious decision to criticise the government openly. 
In order to clarify what my interviewees were engaging in, I explained the main objectives of my 
study to them before the interview. They could also deny answering a question if they did not wish 
to do so. 
As I did not talk to people who had been directly involved in the conflict as victims of violence, I did 
not risk traumatising people by interviewing them about experiences of violence. I was exposed to 
some violent images myself, for example images of mutilated corpses shared on Twitter. However, 
there was no direct exposure to violence during the research as I did not travel to the conflict area. 
 
3.7.2. Positionality 
I acknowledge my own positioning as a researcher and a bias towards the Burundian opposition and 
civil society. Most of the news articles, analysis reports and research blogs that I had read on the 
situation in Burundi prior to gathering the material for this study had been written by international 
writers and organisations. In general, the international discourse on the Burundian crisis is such that 
there is more sympathy for the points of view of the Burundian opposition and civil society than for 
the governmental position. Also, as a student of Peace and Conflict Research I am aware of the 
patterns of structural violence and other cases in which there is a similar government-opposition 
confrontation with asymmetric power relations favouring the government. Therefore, my initial 
stance on the issue was leaning more towards the positions of the anti-government camp. 
During the research process, I have read a considerable amount of material related to the Burundi 
crisis, both by international and local actors. Among the material that I have collected for the study 
and that I have read for my own interest, there have been articles, social media publications, research 
reports and interviews which have supported both the points of view of the opposition-civil society 
camp and the government. During the research process, I have gained knowledge about various 
aspects of the situation in Burundi and my positionality has become more detailed and nuanced. All 
in all, I still think that there are enough reasons to support the argument that human rights violations 
by the government forces are taking place against the civilian population in Burundi. However, as the 
objective of the research was to study local conceptualisations of the conflict issues, it was evident 
that both the views of the government and those opposing it would be taken into account. 
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Since I have worked as a journalist, I am used to upholding a standard of objectivity. That helped me 
to balance between the opposing accounts to some extent. I consciously tried to avoid a bias by being 
open to various opinions and interpretations of conflict events. However, there may have been an 
unconscious bias in the way that I treated the different sources in the text and put them into order, as 
well as in the process of selecting social media material for the data, due to my personal point of view 
mentioned above. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
In this methodological chapter I have discussed the types of data that I am analysing in my study, the 
responsive open-ended interviewing technique that I used to gather interview material and the way in 
which I coded the material. I have presented the methodological tool of discourse analysis and how I 
used it to analyse the material. Finally, I have discussed the limitations and the ethical points of view 
in the research. 
I had various types of material including interviews, social media posts and discussions, videos and 
news articles. I therefore had to code the material according to systematic categories. I had listed them 
in a codebook based on an initial reading of the transcripts of four of the five interviews. Discourse 
and narrative analysis were the tools to identify patterns in the data in order to analyse the conflict 
parties’ legitimisation and the discrepancies in their conceptualisations of violence and dialogue. 
The next chapter presents the analysis of the data that I gathered and the discussion of the results. 
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4. Analysis of the narratives on violence and dialogue 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present the analysis of the narratives and conceptualisations of violence and 
dialogue in the Burundian crisis. I will first present a brief overview of the theoretical concepts that 
constitute the framework of my study and then proceed to the data analysis in which I will make more 
detailed references to the theory. 
The analysis uses a combination of discourse and narrative analysis as I explained in Chapter 3. The 
cross-cutting concepts throughout the analysis are violence and dialogue. I will present the analysis 
in broad groups of discourses which are organised according to the main themes that my sub-research 
questions deal with: conceptualisations of violence; legal and political aspects; ethnicity; and 
economy. The differences and similarities in the narratives and conceptualisations presented by the 
conflict parties are identified in each discourse group. The analysis of the conceptualisations of 
dialogue is connected to the analysis of the conflict discourses. I analyse the discourses’ implications 
for dialogue at the end of the section 4.3. with regard to violence-related discourses and at the end of 
the section 4.4. concerning legal and political narratives. 
The configuration of the conflict parties was discussed in the sections 2.5. and 2.6. Regarding the 
actors, I will analyse the narratives by the government, the opposition and the civil society 
representatives together, not separately. In addition to political actors, my data includes statements of 
ordinary Burundians who are active on social media. I will examine them as part of either the 
government or the civil society-opposition camp, depending on how their positions are aligned. The 
same applies to the civil society representatives at the Inter-Burundian dialogue session that I 
analysed. Although the division to two camps does not always represent all the nuances of the 
opinions within the Burundian society, it helps to analyse the polarisation of the conflict discourses. 
After presenting the theory, I will start the analysis with the discourses on violence in Burundi. The 
following section addresses the discourses of legality, sovereignty and the rule of law. After that, I 
will examine the discourses on ethnicity and economy. The chapter ends with a conclusion which 
discusses the findings. The excerpts from interviews and media sources in French have been 
translated from French to English by the author, as well as the social media posts when mentioned. 
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4.2. Theoretical concepts 
Part of my theoretical framework evolves around the concept of dialogue in the field of conflict 
transformation. Another part of the theory deals with the discursive legitimisation of war and 
violence. I will first explain two concepts relevant in the Burundian conflict context: inclusive 
dialogue and the Inter-Burundian dialogue. After that, I will introduce the theoretical framework of 
radical disagreement and agonistic dialogue and relate these concepts to my research question. Lastly, 
I will present the sociological theory of structuration by Anthony Giddens. 
 
4.2.1. Inclusive dialogue and the Inter-Burundian dialogue 
The international third-party actors have made requests for an inclusive dialogue in the Burundian 
society as a way to deal with the post-electoral violence since 2015. The concept has been popular in 
the United Nations’ peacebuilding discourse and was used for example after the political transition 
in Tunisia in 2011 to bring together different local and national approaches to building peace (Ryan, 
2012, p. 19). 
Regarding Burundi, the African Union and the United Nations among others have called for a 
“genuine and inclusive dialogue, based on the respect of the Arusha Agreement” (Vandeginste, 
2015b, p. 1). On the international level, this has usually referred to the mediation process led by the 
East African Community and facilitator Mkapa (see section 1.2.). Regardless of the interpretation, 
‘inclusive dialogue’ is a term that has been used by Burundians as an ideal of how the dialogue 
between the conflict parties should be, as I will demonstrate in the analysis. 
In addition to the regionally led dialogue, the Government of Burundi organised its own dialogue 
process on the national level. The process started in September 2015 when the government created 
the National Commission of the Inter-Burundian Dialogue [Commission Nationale du Dialogue 
Inter-Burundais, CNDI]. Its objective, defined in Article 6 of the decree on the organisation of the 
dialogue, was to “conduct the process of Inter-Burundian dialogue in the whole country and on all 
levels” (Republic of Burundi, 2015). 
Dialogue sessions were held in the Burundian communes [municipalities], including the capital 
Bujumbura, starting from January 2016. The sessions included participants from women’s, youth’s 
and other civil society organisations, as well as individual participants. There was also a separate 
dialogue session for the police forces in February 2017. The closing ceremony of the dialogue was 
held in March 2017. (RFI, 2016d; Ministère de la sécurité publique, 2017; Isanganiro, 2017)  
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Opposition and civil society groups have criticised the dialogue about being organised on the 
government’s terms (RFI, 2016a). According to Söderberg Kovacs (2016), it was an “orchestrated 
process” with people expressing “with almost mechanical consistency” their will to modify the 
Arusha Agreement and the Constitution to remove the president’s term limits. 
The civil society representatives were given two questions to reflect upon: “According to you, what 
are the reasons of the current crisis?” and “What do you suggest as a solution?”. A government 
representative argues that the participants could express themselves freely and that there were no 
taboos. (Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017) 
 
4.2.2. Radical disagreement and linguistic intractability 
The problem in Burundi is not to say the truth, it is to listen to the truth. Everybody seems to say “it’s my 
truth, it’s my truth”. So do they listen to each other? That is the problem. It is a dialogue of the deaf, on 
one side the power says “it’s like this”, on the other side the opposition says “it’s like this”. 
(Interview of a civil society representative, 1.2.2017) 
 
This definition by an interviewee from a civil society organisation connects well with the concept of 
radical disagreement, defined by Ramsbotham (2010) as “the chief linguistic manifestation of intense 
and intractable political conflict”. He posits that the heated emotions of the conflict parties reduce the 
constructiveness of the communication to the point of a “conversation of the deaf” in which central 
conflict issues cannot be debated anymore and neither party wants to listen to the other (pp. 57, 96). 
According to Ramsbotham (2010), radical disagreement is a clash of discourses. There are major, 
bipolar conflicting discourses and a great number of underlying sub-discourses, the more complex 
the more profoundly the conflict is examined (pp. 18–19). Radical disagreement is a conflict of belief 
understood broadly, opposing for example contradictory subjective perceptions, attitudes, different 
discursive representations and points of view about the reality (pp. 6–8). I argue that Burundi’s post-
electoral crisis is a conflict opposing precisely these types of differing discourses and interpretations 
of the essence of the conflict. 
Radical disagreement can be analysed in terms of the content: arguments opposing each other; or the 
form: incompatible cultural narratives (Ramsbotham, 2010, pp. 6–8, 127). In this study, I analyse the 
content of the arguments of the conflict parties since the parties represent the same cultural 
background. Ramsbotham presents radical disagreement visually by placing opposing statements 
between bar lines ( |  | ). I use the same presenting style in this study. 
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There is also a distinction between truth and validity in radical disagreement. Evaluating whether an 
argument is factually true differs from evaluating if an argument is logically valid – that is, if the 
inference from the basis of the argument to the conclusion holds (Ramsbotham, 2010, pp. 23–24). 
The form is closely connected to content in a radical disagreement: when two claims clash, the logical 
validity of the adversary’s claim cannot be separated from the questions of what he or she is actually 
talking about and if it is true (p. 128). 
Ramsbotham (2010) states based on Habermas’s theory of communicative action that the validity 
claims presented by a conflict party are based on the worlds of objectivity and subjectivity as well as 
the shared social world. The other way around, a conflict party answers to the other by challenging 
the factuality, the moral justification or the personal sincerity of what the adversary is saying (p. 125). 
The justifications and claims that the parties make are always related to the conflict context and are 
politically loaded (p. 25). 
Furthermore, Ramsbotham (2010) argues that facts and values merge together in intense radical 
disagreement and that it is not possible to separate emotion from facts when addressing a radical 
disagreement. When a conflict party wants to challenge a fact presented by the adversary, it does so 
by stating that the argument is not in accordance with a norm. Conversely, challenging a value is done 
by arguing that the adversary’s argument is not legitimate in terms of a fact. This fact/value distinction 
explains why parties can justify their positions with the same principle but contradictorily, since the 
parties may define differently what the principle includes and does not include. (pp. 96, 125–126) 
Ramsbotham applies the concept of radical disagreement to long, intractable conflicts. As I explained 
in Chapter 2, conflict has been present in Burundi since the first inter-ethnic massacres of 1965, with 
more and less active periods of violence. Despite conflict resolution attempts such as the 2000 Arusha 
Agreement, violence has stayed in Burundi and recently manifested itself during and after election 
periods. 
Based on these characteristics, I argue that the Burundian conflict constitutes an intractable conflict 
in which radical disagreement is a useful concept to analyse the tension between the conflict parties, 
namely the government and the opposition-civil society camp. The concept helps to answer the last 
part of my research question: Do the discrepancies in narratives by the conflict actors constitute 
radical disagreements and how do they explain the current tense political situation in Burundi? 
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4.2.3. Agonistic dialogue 
Radical disagreement is connected to the concept of agonistic dialogue. I understand it as a concept 
which underlies the theory of radical disagreement, although I will not use it as a tool for the analysis. 
Ramsbotham (2010) defines it as a dialogue in which opposing parties answer to each other’s 
statements directly or through a third party in intense political struggle. It is not bound by the rules of 
conventional polite discussions. (pp. 93–94) 
The concept of agonism has emerged from the school of thought of agonistic pluralism, one of the 
main figures of which is the political theorist Chantal Mouffe. Agonists agree with the classic idea of 
conflict being inevitable. Mouffe (2007, as cited in Maddison, 2014, p. 1021) argues with regard to 
identity-related conflicts that accepting their inevitability would decrease the probability of violence. 
Ramsbotham (2010) also thinks that conflict that is or could become violent can and should be 
transformed into non-violent change in society (p. 53). 
The analysis of agonistic dialogue is interested in the power relations underlying the dialogue. 
Agonistic dialogue goes beyond the surface and addresses fundamental issues of the conflict such as 
identity, history and politics. Through agonistic dialogue the conflict parties can recognise their 
differences and understand the core issues of the conflict better. (Maddison, 2014, pp. 1022–1023) 
 
4.2.4. Giddens’s theory of structuration 
I already discussed legitimisation as a discursive practice in Chapter 3. The sociologist Anthony 
Giddens’s theory of structuration addresses more specifically the question of legitimising war as a 
social continuity in discourses. I find his theory relevant for my understanding of the Burundian 
conflict parties’ conceptualisations of violence and the narratives with which they legitimise their 
positions in the conflict. The discursive practices are tools that help the conflict parties to make sense 
of what they are doing in the conflict and why they do it. 
Jabri (1996) argues in her book Discourses on Violence, based on Giddens’s theory, that “there are 
discursive and institutional continuities which legitimise and enable war as a form of human conduct 
and which are drawn upon and reproduced by actors in strategic interaction” (p. 54). She sees violent 
conflict, such as Burundi’s political crisis, as conscious human action and a social continuity from 
the point of view of legitimising violence (p. 55). 
Giddens states that there are structured continuities of signification, legitimisation and domination in 
the society. First, Giddens argues that in communicative interaction, there are structures of 
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signification that actors achieve through interpretive schemes and that include symbolic orders and 
discourses that the actors share. Second, structures of legitimisation are based on the norms and 
sanctions in social interaction. Third, there are structures of domination that emerge from 
asymmetrical power relations and produce dominant discourses. According to Giddens, these can be 
challenged by counter-discourses. (Jabri, 1996, pp. 82–85) 
I will explain the theory of structuration more in detail during the analysis. 
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4.3. Discourses on violence 
My first sub-research question concerns the ways in which the Burundian conflict parties have 
conceptualised the violence in Burundi between 2015 and 2017. In order to examine the discrepancies 
between the parties’ narratives on violence, it is illustrative to take an example of the ways in which 
the representatives of the government, the opposition and the civil society answered my interview 
question of how they define the events in Burundi since 2015: 
Since the end of April 2015, right after the designation of Pierre Nkurunziza as the candidate of the party 
CNDD-FDD for the presidential election of 2015, part of the civil society organisations and of the 
opposition parties organised demonstrations … since, as they said, they demonstrated to express their 
opposition to this third term of President Nkurunziza. The demonstrations, which were peaceful in the 
beginning, quickly degenerated into violent protests. And then into an armed insurrection. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017) 
 
There is a political crisis, the security crisis, the institutional crisis, the humanitarian crisis, there is an 
economic crisis, so it is a deep crisis which follows from the coercion for this illegal third term of Pierre 
Nkurunziza. 
(Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, CNARED, 2.2.2017) 
 
What comes to 2015, it is the end of a process of real democratisation of the country, a process that we had 
since 2005 with the return to democratisation and to elections. And during the ten years we have seen that 
the incumbent government has done everything to reverse the progress that we had. 
(Interview of a civil society representative, 1.2.2017) 
 
The government representative defines the violence as an armed uprising against the government, 
speaking within the discourse of ‘rule of law’. On the other hand, the spokesman of the CNARED 
opposition alliance Pancrace Cimpaye emphasises the illegality of the third mandate and defines the 
conflict as multi-layered – conceptualising it in terms of ‘security’, ‘institutions’, ‘humanitarianism’ 
and ‘economy’. The civil society representative residing in Brussels conceptualises the crisis with the 
discourse of ‘authoritarianism’ and defines it as regression from democratisation. 
The discursive divide between the definition of the conflict by the government and the opposition-
civil society camp is deep here. The diplomat conceptualises the conflict as a breach of the ‘rule of 
law’ by those opposing the government, whereas the two others legitimise their positions by 
identifying problems in the government’s actions. This already suggests that there might be a radical 
disagreement between the parties, following Ramsbotham’s (2010) theory. 
A word that often appears in the conflict parties’ statements about the opponent is “manipulation”. It 
is used both by the government and its supporters and the opposition and civil society activists. The 
word is connected to the discourse of ‘information war’ which posits that the opponent manipulates 
information in order to advance its own objectives for a favourable conflict outcome. Jabri (1996) 
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argues that in communicative interaction actors may opt for a strategy of manipulating information 
about what they intend to achieve or of the outside world (p. 165). A statement of an opposition leader 
allied to the government, who comments the phenomenon of corpses found in various places in 
Burundi, illustrates this discourse of ‘information war’ which often delegitimises the diaspora-based 
opposition and civil society in the government camp’s statements: 
According to the President of the party Radebu, talking about a relapse to violence is an easy affirmation, 
an international forgery forged by the radical opposition and supported by the civil society expulsed from 
the country to manipulate the opinion. 
(Interview of Jean de Dieu Mutabazi, opposition leader (Radebu), Iwacu-burundi.org 27.3.2017) 
 
In the ‘information war’ discourse, the phenomenon of increasing violence is conceptualised as a lie 
and as manipulation of information by the opposition-civil society camp. 
The main discourses within which the theme of the essence of the violence in Burundi is addressed 
in my material are the government’s discourse of ‘normality’ and the opposition-civil society camp’s 
discourse of ‘state-led violence’. I will present the analysis of these different narratives first. The 
opposition’s discourse of ‘violent resistance’ is discussed in a separate sub-section and analysed with 
the theory of structuration. The final sub-section analyses the implications of these discourses for the 
dialogue in the crisis and the central question of the disagreement about who the participants of the 
dialogue should be. 
 
4.3.1. Discourses of ‘normality’ and ‘state-led violence’ 
A narrative of ‘normality’ has been very prominent in the Burundian government’s statements about 
the situation in Burundi since the political crisis began. President Nkurunziza’s media and 
communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe described the events in terms of that narrative during the 
coup attempt in Bujumbura in May 2015 and after the attacks on two military bases in the capital in 
December 2015: 
The office of president ordered all Burundians and foreigners to keep calm, he [Willy Nyamitwe] said.  
More than 95% of country is normal and quiet, Mr Nyamitwe added. 
(A live news feed on Burundi’s coup attempt, BBC.com, 13.5.2015) 
 
#Burundi : Rumors are flying that #Bujumbura downtown is vacant because of this attack. It's business as 
usual, ppl at work, kids at school 
(Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe on Twitter, 11.12.2015) 
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On both occasions, the message of the government representative is that normal life continues in 
Burundi. The second tweet includes the discourse of ‘information war’ in addition to the ‘normality’ 
narrative since Nyamitwe refers to “rumours” that argue the opposite. 
In the structuration theory, Giddens states that structures of domination arise from a situation in which 
power is distributed asymmetrically. The hegemonic group uses structures of signification, such as 
shared cultural concepts, to legitimise the groups’ interests. That is the case in Burundi with a 
powerful ruling party and a fragmented opposition and civil society. There are dominant discourses 
in a society’s discursive and institutional practices that are understood as legitimate. Giddens refers 
to the “dialectic of control” as the possibility to challenge a dominant discourse with a counter-
discourse to transform society. (Jabri, 1996, pp. 83–84, 96) 
The dialectic of control can often be observed in the way the ‘state-led violence’ counter-discourse 
of the opposition and civil society challenges the government’s dominant ‘normality’ discourse in 
social media debates. A good example is the discussion in President Pierre Nkurunziza’s Twitter feed 
in September 2016 that followed the release of a report by the UN Independent Investigation on 
Burundi. It revealed human rights violations by the Burundian security services. The series of tweets 
constitutes a long narrative that exemplifies the narrativity and multiple tellership presented by Page 
(2012) and Ochs and Taylor (1992) (see section 3.5.2). 
The stage that was reached more than a year ago is solid. #Burundi is in peace, the Burundians are united, 
whatever certain people say (Pierre Nkurunziza, @nkurunziza, 24.9.2016 (translation from French)) 
 
In his first tweet, Nkurunziza as the initiator of the narrative promotes the idea of Burundi being in a 
situation of normality instead of conflict. The tweet also includes the discourse of Burundian ‘unity’ 
which is often mentioned in discourses supporting the government. Furthermore, Nkurunziza uses 
the discursive strategy of exclusion (Fairclough, 2003, p. 145) by omitting the actors who disagree 
about the purported unity and peacefulness of Burundi. However, based on the timing of 
Nkurunziza’s tweet, it is not difficult to conclude that “certain people” refers to the UN investigators 
whose report accuses the Burundian security forces of violence towards civilians. 
This exclusion of actors is part of the Burundian diplomatic discourse throughout my material. The 
Burundian diplomat in Brussels that I interviewed justified his choice of not naming partners that he 
sees as spoilers in the Burundian crisis by saying: “it is not in our habits to name them directly”. 
The second tweet and the ensuing replies engage in a discursive competition: 
It is my faith, it is what I have lived: finally, it is not the number of lies or rumours that counts, neither the 
force of those who say it 
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(Pierre Nkurunziza, @nkurunziza, 24.9.2016 (translation from French)) 
 
@pnkurunziza they are nihilists [nihilo] and the whole #Burundi-an people already found out. We have 
lived the horrors of war and we want peace. 
(KARIKERA, @bihomvor, 24.9.2016 (translation from French)) 
 
It is not your faith that has done [sic] you like that it is the will of the all-mighty 
(ngendakumana, @ngendak52012764, 26.9.2016 (translation from French)) 
 
@pnkurunziza I thank God all the time. You had said that we would cast our vote in peaceful situation; it 
was so. #GodWithBurundi 
(David Ndabacekure @DNdabacekure, 24.9.2016) 
 
@pnkurunziza This is the reality your power is horrible + year that the people are massacred these youth 
of Mutakura hope to live in peace! 
(Barabitembeje @barabitembeje, 24.9.2016 (translation from French)) 
 
@pnkurunziza may god bless you all the time! 
(Tuyisenge Marc @TuyisengeMarc, 24.9.2016) 
 
Two discourses cross in Nkurunziza’s second tweet. The first one, once again, is the discourse of 
‘information war’ which labels the accusations of government-related violence as “lies” and 
“rumours” disseminated by external actors. The other one is a religious discourse that is present in 
the expression “my faith”. This discourse is part of the dominant discourse and often used by the 
president when he talks to Burundians in a local context. Also some opposition and civil society 
supporters refer to religion in their narratives, but not to the same extent as the president and the 
government camp. 
Nkurunziza addresses his narrative to the Burundian nation as a whole, using in one of his later tweets 
the expression “dear countrymen”. The discourse of ‘information war’ is reinforced by KARIKERA 
who labels “them”, the external powers, as “nihilists” and asserts that Burundians know better what 
they need. The tweets of the other narrators Ngendakumana, David Ndabacekure and Tuyisenge Marc 
replicate the religious discourse that is present in Nkurunziza’s tweet. 
The ‘state-led violence’ counter-discourse in this social media narrative comes from Barabitembeje 
who challenges the dominant narrative on Burundi’s situation in the discussion. His tweet contains a 
photo of five corpses and probably refers to the killings of five young people by police officers in the 
quartier of Mutakura in northern Bujumbura in December 2015 (Couteau, 2015). 
In another example of Giddens’s concept of dialectic of control, the Burundian journalist based in 
Brussels challenges the dominant government discourse of ‘normality’: 
They [the government] say that everything is perfect, that everything is fine, but in the same time the 
president now does not travel anymore. And when he has to move from a province to another, he has to do 
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it in an armoured car. Why all these measures when everything is going well? (Interview of a Burundian 
journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
Part of the ‘normality’ discourse of the government narrative is to conceptualise the violence in 
Burundi as ‘isolated attacks’ or as ‘terrorism’. The interview of the diplomat at the Burundian 
Embassy in Brussels illustrates this conceptualisation: 
…compared to 2015 security prevails in the country. Apart from a few assassinations that one notes, 
targeted assassinations of political and military personalities, and apart from a few armed attacks. And that 
is not only in Burundi, one finds it also in other countries, even countries with strong democratic traditions, 
like in Europe, there are crazy people who commit this kind of regrettable acts. And the people do their 
daily activities everywhere, people are at their work, be it in the countryside, the farmers work, farm their 
fields and raise their cattle, the salesmen do their activities. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat compares the violence in Burundi to terrorist attacks in Europe and undermines the 
importance of violent acts: there are only “a few” of them. Nevertheless, he recognises that there are 
“targeted assassinations” of politicians and army officers taking place. 
Furthermore, the ‘isolated attacks’ narrative echoed by public officials sometimes qualifies the 
killings as mere criminal cases of public order, as the following comment of the spokesman of the 
Burundian police forces shows. The spokesman was interviewed after there had been news reports 
on “the phenomenon of corpses” – an increase of the amount of dead bodies found around the country 
in March 2017. 
“There is no relapse of violence”, indicates the spokesman of the police. It is about mere isolated criminal 
cases of public order (showdowns, banditry, witchcraft). According to Pierre Nkurikiye, there is no political 
machinery behind these killings and no ethnic group is targeted. 
(Interview of Pierre Nkurikiye, spokesman of the police, Iwacu-burundi.org 27.3.2017) 
 
The counter-discourse by civil society representatives concerning the same issue falls under the 
discourse of ‘state-led violence’. The interpretation by one of them was that there had been an increase 
in violent acts by the government’s security forces and the Imbonerakure youth militia, targeting 
especially the opposition and the former members of the Burundian Army which had an ethnic Tutsi 
majority. 
“The phenomenon of corpses comes back at a worrying speed. The tendency resembles the one observed 
towards the end of the year 2015”, indicates this activist of human rights. According to him it is a repression 
done by the defence and security forces and by the young militants of the party in power, the Imbonerakure. 
“What scares still is that this repression concentrates on the ex-FAB members and the youth of the 
opposition.” 
(Interview of Anschaire Nikoyagize, human rights defender, Iwacu-burundi.org 27.3.2017) 
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The lexical choices in the statement are typical for this discourse: the word “repression” reinforces 
the image of a powerful government against an oppressed opposition and ethnic minority. The words 
“worrying” and “scare” indicate the fear of facing violence by state forces. 
Interestingly, the ‘isolated attacks’ discourse, almost exclusively attributed to the government, is 
present in the civil society representative’s narrative at one point. 
So regarding the other movements we do not know, there are sometimes some attacks, we do not know 
exactly who it is, there are movements that are… but without an organised structure. – – So on the other 
side there is a government that holds its grip on power by force and on the other side some opposition actors 
that are organising themselves and maybe, since there is a lack of dialogue, will be facing each other – – 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
This may indicate that the civil society representative sees the opposition actors as dispersed and that 
there are some acts of violence that cannot be clearly attributed to any group. However, his statements 
later in the interview reinforce the narrative that the majority of the violence is committed by the 
government forces. He speaks within the ‘history’ discourse, stating that there has been violence in 
Burundi since the 1960s. He states that there is a “system of political violence” in Burundi since 2008 
when the last rebel group, FNL-Palipehutu, signed a peace agreement with the government. 
So it started with the hunt for the opposition members from FNL – – There was the hunt for opposition 
members, even in CNDD-FDD, the party in power, those who did not agree were either hunted or even 
imprisoned. So there was a whole system of violence which was put in place. And until 2015 when the 
ruling party faced texts violating the Arusha Agreement. So it was necessary to use violence to refuse to 
apply these texts. – – and when the people demonstrated, it could only end with a violent repression by the 
current government – – 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The ‘repression’ sub-discourse of this narrative belongs to the discourse of ‘state-led violence’. The 
activist thinks that the system of violence is a state machinery used against all those who oppose the 
government. This perception of a system of political violence put in place by CNDD-FDD is 
supported by the studies of Daley and Popplewell (2016), Reyntjens (2015) Van Acker (2015). The 
role of the Arusha Agreement is further analysed in the section 4.4. 
The discourse of ‘state-led violence’ comes across strongly from the Facebook post published on 
December 16, 2015 by Félix Muheto, a Burundian author-businessman living in Canada, and shared 
by the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe. Muheto’s post is in the form of a letter addressed 
to President Nkurunziza and concerns the death of Muheto’s brother in the massacres of December 
11-12, 2015. According to the Burundian army, 87 people died in Bujumbura during those two days 
in killings that followed the attacks to three military bases by armed groups (FIDH, 2016, p. 48; RFI, 
2015). Here are some excerpts of the post: 
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My friend Peter, HE Pierre Nkurunziza, President of Burundi, 
Contrary to what your advisors and spokesmen say, to me, all the Burundians are friends. “We have killed 
this many enemies and have arrested this many; and on the friendly side, there have been this many dead 
and injured.” I cite your delegates or functionaries. To speak in terms of enemies and friends does not make 
any sense in the context of Burundi. Brothers and sisters would be more appropriate. Because the 
dissensions between brothers and sisters do not necessarily lead to killings. But rather to dialogue. – – 
 
My little brother died this Saturday 12th December (1212victimes). He was really not your enemy. On the 
contrary, he admired you. He probably received fatal and cowardly gunshots in the back while he was 
running for cover in order to protect himself against the rain of bullets that hit his body. He really believed 
in you, in your capacity and your willingness to protect all the Burundian citizens. – –  
 
The Burundian people believed and hoped that, with your experiences of horror, first with the death of your 
father in 1972, then with your painful experience of the 90s, you would be sensible to human suffering. 
Power makes one blind, especially when one comes from that far, humanely speaking. I am almost not 
angry at you. 
(Félix Muheto on Facebook, 16.12.2015) 
 
The narrative is written in a poetic language typical for the literature genre, creating a narrative story 
as defined by Fairclough (2003, p. 83). In addition, its medium is letter, a text that is addressed to a 
specific recipient, in this case President Nkurunziza. The author has published it in the social media. 
The personal way of writing to the president and the literary style make the narrative rhetorically 
powerful. 
In addition to the discourse of ‘state-led violence’, the narrative contains the discourses of ‘unity’, 
‘inclusive dialogue’, ‘history’ and ‘authoritarianism’. The discourse of ‘unity’ is conveyed by the 
expressions “all the Burundians are friends” and “brothers and sisters”. This implies in terms of 
dialogue that the narrator conceptualises the ideal dialogue in the Burundian conflict as inclusive, like 
between friends or family members. The narrator creates a discursive contrast between ‘unity’ and 
‘state-led violence’ by stating that his brother was a supporter of Nkurunziza but still got killed by 
the security forces. In the last chapter, the ‘history’ discourse connects Burundi’s 1972 killings and 
the Civil War of the 1990s with Nkurunziza’s personal history and suggests that those events should 
have changed his attitude towards violence. At the end, the narrator conceptualises the Burundian 
crisis as a consequence of ‘authoritarianism’, the abuse of power, and suggests that the blinding effect 
of power is somewhat understandable and that it is possible to forgive. 
My material also includes other similar narratives that describe the violence within the discourse of 
‘state-led violence’. Most of them are written by the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe. 
Furthermore, France24’s online TV documentary Burundi: Fear and Exile narrates the Burundian 
conflict by interviewing Burundian refugees in Uganda and Tanzania as well as exiled civil society 
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and opposition activists mostly in Belgium. In the documentary, a member of the opposition party 
MSD in exile in Uganda presents a primary narrative on violence: 
 
I was arrested by the commander of the brigade Gihanga. I was arrested on a Sunday, it was the 2nd August. 
On Monday I was taken to the police station in Gihanga. On Monday around 11 o’clock I was handcuffed 
and transferred to the Documentation [SNR intelligence service headquarters] in Bujumbura. At that 
moment, they started to hit me. They hit me the whole day. I was beaten hard. I was kicked in the face, in 
the back, I was beaten by the colonel Alexis. I was in a cell with 42 men. In the night we organised it so 
that there were 20 who slept and 20 who stayed awake. Every evening they came to take away young men. 
I don't know where but they never came back. It’s obvious they killed them. Every ten years there’s a crisis. 
I grew up during the war, I grew old during the war. I don’t want to go back to my country. 
(Interview of “Léonard”, France24 documentary Burundi: Fear and Exile 20.1.2017) 
 
This account differs from the other narratives presented in this section since it gives a first-hand 
account of the violence. This narrative clearly belongs to the ‘state-led violence’ discourse. It 
conceptualises the violence as torture done by members of the intelligence service. 
In conclusion, the opposition and the civil society have mostly conceptualised the violence in Burundi 
as repression by the government forces. On the other hand, the government has conceptualised the 
violence as ‘isolated attacks’ and ‘terrorism’ and repeatedly described Burundi as being in a situation 
of ‘normality’. There is a radical disagreement between the conceptualisations of violence and it can 
be described in the following way: 
 
| ‘The violence in Burundi consists of isolated violent acts.’ 
‘The violence in Burundi is systematic state repression of those who are against the government.’ | 
 
 
4.3.2. Discourse of ‘violent resistance’ 
According to Giddens’s structuration theory, signification is related to communication and the key 
role of language in conflict. Conflicts include communicative acts like threats, complaints or warnings 
which are signals specific to their context. They are bound by the rules of the society that apply also 
in the time of conflict, even though conflict creates its own code of conduct. Furthermore, there are 
discursive paradigms which justify using violence in a conflict. (Jabri, 1996, pp. 73–75) 
Regarding legitimisation, the actors’ desires and beliefs affect their response to arising conflict. 
Besides, the way in which an actor justifies decisions depends on the expectations towards the actor’s 
role which offers him or her “legitimising reasons”. They are different from the real reasons for taking 
a certain type of action (Jabri, 1996, pp. 67, 69) 
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These legitimising reasons and signals are central to how the actors in the Burundian conflict justify 
their positions. The dependence of the legitimisation on the actor’s role is visible in the discrepancies 
between the conflict parties’ narratives: the ways in which the government of Burundi legitimises its 
positions are different from those of an opposition actor due to their different statuses. The political 
opposition, for example, is expected to criticise the government, which sets certain limits to its 
legitimisation possibilities. Moreover, the signals that the conflict parties use are based on their 
common cultural and linguistic framework and discourses that all of them understand. 
Threats are in Burundi’s case for example warnings of historical acts that will be repeated, as 
demonstrated by this comment by a civil society representative: 
So we can say that today’s Burundi has come back to how it was in the 1990s, the years in the beginning 
of the 90s after the bloody coup, so today it is almost the same thing. We have a somewhat illegitimate 
government, some elections have not been according to democratic norms. We have a government that 
imposed itself, that has refused to apply the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement … And at some point 
there is the risk of a popular movement. People will be facing a wall and from there there is no peaceful 
solution. … We try to see [sic] in the violence what has happened in Burundi before; that people have taken 
up arms to fight the government in power. 
(Interview of a Burundian civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The activist refers to the failed coup attempt by the army and the outbreak of the Burundian Civil 
War in 1993 (see section 2.2.). The warning expressed here is that the violent history might repeat 
itself since there is a culture of popular armed ‘violent resistance’ in Burundi. The ‘history’ discourse 
specific to the Burundian context constitutes a framework that all the conflict parties know. The 
comparison to the beginning of the 1990s in Burundi is a structure of signification that is commonly 
shared. 
Discursive paradigms of legitimisation that justify the use of violence in the conflict are common in 
the opposition’s statements. For example, the representative of the CNARED opposition alliance 
justifies the possibility of using violence with the government’s violent acts and states that the 
government’s violent means dictate the ways in which the opposition should respond. 
Well… you know… in this kind of a situation it is the enemy that dictates to you the ways to fight it. The 
first way is the peaceful way – – If he comes to the negotiation table, we will negotiate, we will find a 
solution. But if he does not come to the negotiation table, it is classical, it is well known. There is a youth 
that cannot stand, cannot eternally accept to be killed, to be hunted, to die in the refugee camps. And you 
know very well that – – every person in a refugee camp abroad only dreams about coming back in any 
possible way. – – One day, the youth will wake up and say that we have to use the means that Nkurunziza 
understands. And the way that Nkurunziza understands more and more is violence, unfortunately. 
(Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
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Cimpaye uses several techniques of discursive legitimisation and rhetoric to justify the potential use 
of violence. The discourse of ‘violent resistance’ here resembles classical leftist revolutionary 
discourse. Cimpaye sees the violence as an alternative to negotiations if they fail and legitimises the 
use of violence with the president’s authoritarianism. He also uses the expression “in every way” 
many times during the interview, emphasising the all-encompassing nature of the resistance and the 
purported readiness of all the parties to use force if needed. Earlier during the interview Cimpaye 
used similar rhetoric:  
So I am telling you that currently the project that is going on is to appoint Nkurunziza as a president for a 
lifetime, which is something that the Burundian people will not accept, of course. Because it would be a 
collective suicide to accept an autocrat like Pierre Nkurunziza as the head of the state ad vitam aeternam 
[eternally]. It is inacceptable. It is inacceptable. We will fight this project in every way. 
(Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
Here, Cimpaye uses the lexical metaphor “collective suicide” to demonstrate the alleged willingness 
of Burundians to resist Nkurunziza’s rule. Furthermore, the repetition of the expression “It is 
inacceptable” is also a discursive element that underlines the speaker’s negative stance on 
Nkurunziza’s prolonged presidency. Van Dijk (2006a) mentions repetition as one rhetorical function 
that can be used as a way to underline the negative features of the opposing group (pp. 126–127). 
As Jabri (1996) argued above, the desire of Cimpaye and the CNARED alliance in general to get rid 
of Nkurunziza’s rule affects their response to the conflict. It is used as a legitimisation for potentially 
using violence in resistance. 
Cimpaye’s comments constitute the kind of counter-discourse attempting to transform the society that 
Giddens’s concept of “dialectic of control” suggests. Cimpaye defines the ways in which the 
opposition pursues the transformation as either dialogue or violent uprising, depending on the 
government’s actions. 
 
4.3.3. Implications for the dialogue 
The government’s discourse of ‘normality’ sometimes implies in terms of dialogue that the 
government refuses to dialogue. In a news article published on the day on which the crisis entered its 
third year, Burundi’s vice-president iterates this position. 
 
There is total peace in Burundi. It is an imaginary crisis, whether the detractors like it or not. There may be 
some incidents which, however, cannot spoil the national peace and the national harmony. Today, the crisis 
is behind us. Unfortunately, the sequels are still there and we are facing all of that. 
(Interview of Burundi’s Vice-President Gaston Sindimwo, RFI.fr, 25.4.2017) 
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The vice-president also refers to the violence through the discourse of ‘isolated attacks’ and 
rhetorically de-emphasises the violence with the use of the word “may”. This kind of de-emphasising 
is called discursive group polarisation and is usually done to diminish the importance of the bad things 
done by the speaker’s own side (Van Dijk, 2006b, p. 374). The vice-president sees the crisis as being 
behind, which implies that there is no need for dialogue to solve any crisis. Therefore, the discourse 
of ‘normality’ indicates here a discursive practice of not participating in the dialogue (Fairclough, 
2003, p. 24). 
On the other hand, the government has also claimed to be open for dialogue. For instance, the 
Burundian diplomat in Brussels conceptualises the dialogue as ‘inclusive’ and refers to the 
participation of Burundi in the meetings of the regional mediation process. 
And another factor is that Burundi still enjoys the support of the region East African Community, of the 
African Union, of the United Nations and of other partners in pursuing the inclusive dialogue which is, in 
my opinion, the only way that can lead to a durable solution of the Burundian conflict. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The discourse of ‘inclusive dialogue’ is something that both conflict parties share. It is represented 
as an ideal and as the unique way to solve the crisis in several narratives, for example in a Facebook 
post of the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe: 
 
But one thing is for sure: the honour of Burundi will happen through inclusive dialogue and the construction 
of a real constitutional state. It cannot accommodate the impunity of crimes. It will never be constructed 
with an impostor like Pierre Nkurunziza. The honour of Burundi will also happen through national 
reconciliation and the changing of mentalities about governance. 
(Facebook post by Pacifique Nininahazwe, 25.8.2016, translated from French) 
 
Nininahazwe’s narrative contains the discourses of ‘legality’ and ‘democracy’ and he connects 
‘inclusive dialogue’ to reconciliation that should accommodate all the constituents of the society. 
There are also requests for an inter-ethnic inclusive dialogue, like this one by a representative of a 
Twa association in the Inter-Burundian dialogue session: 
 
There have to be negotiations between the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa and the Ganwa and that the 
Burundian refugees are also included. 
(A male speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, UNIPROBU association) 
 
There is a deep disagreement between the conflict parties about who is entitled to participate in the 
formal dialogue process, the negotiations in Arusha. The civil society activist based in Brussels 
analyses the implications of Burundi’s political situation for the dialogue in Arusha like this: 
The facilitation is ambiguous, we do not know what the facilitation is, where it is headed. So it is this kind 
of dialogue, I do not know if it is a dialogue for dialoguing, – – there will be no solution. And so now, if it 
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is about negotiating, it is a question of power relations, – – And at the moment, the government refuses to 
dialogue, that is, refuses to negotiate, because what is on the other side? That is the question. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The civil society activist conceptualises the dialogue within the discourse of ‘power’. He thinks that 
the Arusha mediation process does not progress because of the “power relations”, the fact that the 
government is more powerful than its counterpart, the fractured opposition. 
The last sentence indicates that the messiness of the opposition is a problem that makes it difficult to 
define who should be negotiating with the government. The activist thinks that the opposition should 
organise itself better and speak with one voice. One problem is the phenomenon of nyakurisation (see 
section 2.5.) which has blurred the line between the government and opposition actors, as quotes by 
the civil society activist and the journalist illustrate: 
There are some political parties in the opposition that we call alimentary parties. There are people who 
create parties in order to survive. So they are there around the government, some satellites – – or they are 
false opposition activists. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
They sent CNDD-FDD party members in or created a division inside the party to put in place organisms, 
people of the opposition party that they will collaborate with. And so, the so-called dialogue announced by 
the government is a dialogue by CNDD-FDD with the opposition parties that agree with it. – – The parties 
that constitute the real opposition have not been associated to the dialogue. 
(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The journalist conceptualises dialogue in terms of freedom of expression and plurality of parties. He 
argues that the government has put in place a monologue instead of an inclusive dialogue. 
In addition to the opposition, the problem of blurred boundaries concerns the Burundian civil society. 
The Brussels-based diplomat and civil society activist describe the emergence of a political civil 
society in addition to the traditional civil society organisations: 
 
The civil society and political opposition came together in order to fight the third mandate. – – this civil 
society, since they did not have the trust of those in power in the beginning and found themselves clearly 
on the side of the politicians. – – This activist civil society is between two tendencies. At the same time, 
they played the game by saying “we are the civil society” but at the same time they did politics. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
I mean that from 2015 until today we have seen that on the one hand, part of the civil society organisations 
has unfortunately shifted to a role that was not theirs. It has played the role of the political opposition. – – 
And so this disqualified it from the traditional role of a civil society that is recognised by the laws in Burundi 
and elsewhere in the world. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017) 
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The diplomat delegitimises the political civil society by speaking within a national and international 
legal discourse. Furthermore, he uses the expression “traditional role” to argue that these 
organisations are not acting according to norms. 
The government’s recurrent discourse of conceptualising the violence in Burundi as ‘terrorism’ 
provides legitimisation for excluding from the dialogue those members of the opposition that the 
government sees as terrorists and plotters of the coup attempt in May 2015. The diplomat at the 
Burundian Embassy in Brussels legitimises his position by a combination of discursive moral 
evaluation and authorisation, referring to the international values and practices of dealing with acts 
of terrorism. 
In no country is a terrorist, for example, invited to sit on [sic] a table, he goes in front of the tribunals. So 
that is not only the government, … even the United Nations, even the region, the East African Community, 
agree on that. So the people who have killed innocent citizens do not have a place in the dialogue because 
they have opted for unfounded violence, people who have thrown grenades onto the marketplace, no place 
in the dialogue. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat refers to the United Nations as part of the international community and to the regional 
organisation EAC as other authorities that according to him agree with Burundi’s position on 
terrorism. The strategy of discursive authorisation with reference to international norms or to the 
government’s cooperation with the regional and international institutions is present in many of the 
government’s statements that I analysed. This is interesting since on the contrary, sovereignty is a 
value that the government often emphasises, as I will argue in the next section. 
The spokesman of the CNARED alliance has an opposite view to that of the government about the 
participants in the dialogue. He mentions “inclusiveness” as the goal of the dialogue process and 
wants it to include also the armed movements: 
 
And this framework, we want it to be inclusive. If it is not inclusive, it becomes a monologue. We want the 
civil society to be there, we want that the representatives of the religious confessions are there, we want 
that the representatives of the youth are there. We even want that those who have taken up the armed fight 
are there, – – the FNL of Nzabampema, the RED-Tabara of Melchiade Biremba, the FOREBU of 
Godefroid Niyombare. All these three major armed movements have to be around this table to discuss. 
Because we cannot leave them outside and think that we will have peace. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
Also the civil society activist in Brussels thinks that the government should dialogue with the 
CNARED. According to him, the military coup of May 2015 was internal. The activist accuses the 
government of a lack of logical validity: 
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In CNARED, there are no putschist militaries. – – There are putschists – – who are imprisoned in Burundi 
and others who have fled but until now the putschists have not spoken out to form a dialogue, have not 
formed a movement that would come to negotiate with him [Nkurunziza]. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
However, the government position has stayed uncompromising throughout the crisis. Another 
example of the government’s refusal to dialogue with those to whom it refers as “radical opposition” 
is visible in the tweets by President Nkurunziza’s media and communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe 
in January 2016. The government first responded to the invitation to an African Union-led dialogue 
session in Tanzania in the following way: 
 
No dialogue tomorrow, neither the 16th January like many thought because there is no consensus on the 
date. (Joseph Bangurambona, the Permanent Secretary of the Burundian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
LeMonde.fr 5.1.2016) 
 
Nyamitwe commented the participation of the CNARED opposition alliance in the negotiations on 
Twitter like this: 
 
#BurundiDialogue I told Jeremie Minani it’s one’s right to dream when he stated @cnaredburundi needs 
to be part of a transitional Gvt 
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 8.1.2016 
 
#BurundiDialogue @cnaredburundi would like to have 2 parties in this dialogue (Gvt - Cnared). Something 
that he won’t get. 
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 9.1.2016 (translation from French) 
 
Jeremie Minani has called for the population to arm themselves. Sinduhije of @CnaredBurundi is a 
trouble-maker and distributes weapons in Mutakura & Musaga. 
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 9.1.2016 (translation from French) 
 
The Gvt of #Burundi cannot be on the same table with @cnaredburundi according to the 2248 Resolution 
of the #UNSC “peaceful stakeholders” 
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 9.1.2016 (translation from French) 
 
Nyamitwe addresses his tweets to the president of the CNARED, Jérémie Minani, and to the 
Commissioner for defense and security questions Alexis Sinduhije. Both are also leaders of 
opposition parties. Nyamitwe engages in a discursive battle against CNARED and claims that the 
platform is inciting Burundians into violence. 
Jérémie Minani commented the same issue in a news article, accusing the government of refusing to 
dialogue: 
It is a shame for the country and for Africa, who continue to observe the arrogance of this man who still 
dictates his criminal law to everybody. … It is simply a way to mislead the national and international 
opinion. The government of Bujumbura simply does not want negotiations. The problem of consensus on 
the date is simply a pretext. (Jérémie Minani, the president of the CNARED, Iwacu-Burundi.org 10.1.2016) 
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The parties have conflicting perceptions about who can be accepted as a negotiating party. The 
opposition alliance, represented here in the latest example by its president Jérémie Minani, wants the 
government to come to the negotiation table with the alliance. He also presents a claim about the 
President Nkurunziza “dictating his criminal law”, implying that the government is illegitimate. The 
government, on the other hand, sees the oppositio1n alliance as an armed movement that also incites 
citizens to violence. Nyamitwe’s last tweet implies that the government does not negotiate with actors 
who are not peaceful. The reference to the United Nations Security Council is an external 
authorisation for his argument. 
The positions of the conflict parties can be presented in terms of the theory of radical disagreement. 
The core issue at stake, deciding who should participate in the dialogue on the Burundian crisis, is 
presented here between the bar lines used for describing radical disagreement: 
| ‘The (illegitimate) government has to negotiate with the whole opposition.’ 
‘The government does not negotiate with the armed opposition.’ | 
The position above is that of the opposition and civil society. It states that the government should talk 
to all the opposition actors, mainly the CNARED alliance. The one below is the government’s 
position which excludes negotiating with the “radicalised”, armed opposition groups. 
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4.4. Legal and political discourses 
In the Burundian post-electoral crisis, the government, opposition and civil society actors most often 
refer to legal and political aspects when they justify their positions. This section addresses the sub-
research question What kind of narratives have the conflict parties presented on the legal and political 
aspects of the conflict? 
The clash of discourses between the ‘rule of law’ discourse of the government and the ‘legality’ 
discourse of the opposition and civil society is related to the debate about the right of President Pierre 
Nkurunziza to a third term and about the legality of the 2015 elections. Furthermore, the government 
camp’s discourses of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘foreign interference’ accuse international actors of 
interfering in the Burundian crisis. 
I will first present the analysis of the discourses of legality, rule of law and sovereignty. After that, I 
will discuss the implications of the legal and political aspects for the dialogue in the political crisis 
with a special focus on the opposition’s ‘external pressure’ discourse. 
 
4.4.1. Discourses of legality, sovereignty and the rule of law 
The ‘legality’ discourse of the Burundian opposition and civil society narratives represents the Arusha 
Agreement of 2000 and the Constitution of 2005 as core documents which the government has 
violated during the political crisis. The legal framework is mostly used in this discourse to 
demonstrate that Nkurunziza’s third term is illegal and illegitimate (see section 1.1.). This comment 
of the vice-president of the opposition party FRODEBU illustrates the importance of the Constitution 
for the opposition: 
 
This Constitution has been accepted via referendum and as a consequence, it is our property and nobody 
can appropriate it to himself, not even the president of the Republic.  
(Frédéric Bamvuginuymvira, vice-president of the opposition party FRODEBU, RFI.fr, 10.6.2015) 
 
The opposition politician commented the issue with regard to participating in dialogue with the 
government before the elections of the summer 2015. He considered the question of Nkurunziza’s 
third term as non-negotiable in terms of the Constitution as well as the Arusha Agreement. The 
Burundian journalist in Brussels conceptualises the political crisis as a violation of the Constitution 
and the third term as illegal. 
 
A term is a term. So, for me it was two terms that were already completed, and a third was added to them 
– – He wanted to change it via the Parliament, by changing the Constitution, but he did not get a favourable 
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outcome in the Parliament. And so, he did it by coercion, he said “yes, I have to do a third term”. Before 
that, he had said that he will defer to the will of his party. Well indeed, formally his party did this favour to 
him, but one can see that there are disagreements in his party – – 
(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The journalist conceptualises the third term issue within the sub-discourse of ‘authoritarianism’, 
stating that the president changed the term limits by coercion. The same expression is used by the 
CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye (see the beginning of Chapter 4.3.). He also conceptualises 
the situation in Burundi as authoritarian rule and indicates an “absence of justice”: 
They would like to put us in a pensée unique, in a form of governance of a unique party, a single-party 
system – – We have a Burundi beyond all of that, without the press, without the civil society, without the 
political parties of opposition, we are in a de facto single-party system in which there is state terrorism in 
Burundi – –  
– – Justice does not exist anymore. Justice is at the mercy of politics, it is dramatic. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
Cimpaye makes the lexical choice of using the words “state terrorism” and “single party system” to 
describe the situation in Burundi. There is an underlying sub-discourse of ‘totalitarianism’ which 
makes intertextual references to dictatorships like the former East Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. 
The Brussels-based civil society activist, on the other hand, conceptualises the political crisis as a 
failure of putting the legal framework of the Arusha Agreement into practice: 
– – if all of this had to happen, it is because in reality there are things in the Arusha Agreement that have 
not been implemented. And since these things have not been implemented, we could only get to this 
situation. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The activist mentions the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was agreed upon in the Arusha 
Agreement and would investigate the crimes committed in Burundi between 1962 and 2008 (RFI, 
2016e). It was planned that the Commission would be founded soon after 2000 but it was only 
launched in March 2016. 
Furthermore, the ‘legality’ discourse legitimises violence in resistance against the government, as 
was discussed in the sub-section 4.3.2. The opposition activist conceptualises the coup attempt of 
May 2015 within the ‘legality’ discourse and legitimises the putschists’ use of violence. 
The coup d’état… they were indeed militaries… I would not really call that a coup d’état. They wanted to 
establish the constitutional order because the man who did the coup d’état is Pierre Nkurunziza. He did the 
coup d’état against all the institutions, he did the coup d’état against the Constitution, he did the coup d’état 
against the Arusha Agreement. It is him who is illegal, irregular. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
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The discursive strategies of repetition, regarding the bad deeds of the government; and group 
polarisation, by de-emphasising the bad deeds of the opposition, are in use here (Van Dijk, 2006a). 
In terms of Giddens’s structuration theory, the discursive paradigm that legitimises the violence 
during the coup d’état is representing Nkurunziza as an “illegal” leader that should be deposed by 
force.  
The ‘constitutional order’ narrative is a counter-discourse to the dominant discourse of ‘institutional 
order’ in the government’s statements. The latter belongs to the ‘rule of law’ discourse that 
emphasises the decision of Burundi’s Constitutional Court on May 5, 2015, to approve President 
Nkurunziza’s third term as constitutional, as demonstrated by this quote by the Burundian diplomat 
based in Brussels: 
 
– – a political solution for the current tensions would be that the political class as a whole, the civil society 
as a whole, and the society as a whole, and even the Burundians yield to the verdict of the ballot and that 
the decisions of the tribunals are respected and that the laws of the country are respected. Because now if 
the civil society and, a part of the civil society and the radical opposition fuel the crisis, it is because they 
did not want to yield to the decision of the Constitutional Court, even though it is the only one authorised 
by the law to interpret the Constitution. In other countries, there is the Supreme Court or the Council of 
State. Once they have judged, nobody can contest any more. You yield. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017) 
 
The discourse of ‘rule of law’ also contains external authorisation. The diplomat refers to the Court 
of Justice of the East African Community which decided that it cannot rule on a case on which 
Burundi’s courts have already made a judgement (Iwacu, 2016).  
The discourses of ‘democracy’ and ‘sovereignty’ are also recurrent in the government’s narratives. It 
legitimises its position in power by referring to the results of the 2015 elections (see the section 1.1.) 
and the “will of the people”. The government narrative is that the Burundians have given the president 
and the CNDD-FDD party a mandate to govern. Therefore, the ‘sovereignty’ discourse has two 
implications: combined with the ‘democracy’ discourse, it gives the government internal 
legitimisation for staying in power, and the discourse of ‘sovereignty’ alone gives it external 
legitimisation. The two discourses underlie the Burundian diplomat’s conceptualisation of the reasons 
for the conflict: 
And I would say that certain leaders of the radical opposition and certain other adventurers deny the deep 
entrenchment of democracy in Burundi. In their error of reasoning, they continue to think that they will rise 
to power without passing through the verdict of the ballot. And that probab… due to the support of certain 
foreign political and financial circles. – – 
 
Another reason, for me, is the determination of the current government to – – ensure the sovereignty of the 
country and not to answer positively to the orders of some of our partners who unilaterally set the norms of 
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what is or is not suitable for Burundi. You see a regrettable attitude of some of our partners who say “ah, 
that is good for Burundi and it has to go to this direction” without even asking the Burundians. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat uses the word “adventurers” as a way to undermine the seriousness of the opposition 
groups that are against the government and challenges the logical validity of their claims by saying 
“in their error of reasoning”. According to Ramsbotham (2010, see sub-section 4.2.2.), this is part of 
the evaluation of the form of the opponent’s argument in radical disagreement. 
The Facebook post of Pierre Nkurunziza after the CNDD-FDD’s victory in the parliamentary and 
communal elections of June 29, 2015 also represents the discourses of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘democracy’: 
It is a very important victory for the independence of Burundi in terms of political leadership, but also a 
victory which reminds of the sovereignty of the Burundian people. – –  Voting and democracy are the only 
ways to access power in Burundi. (President Pierre Nkurunziza on Facebook, 30.6.2015) 
 
The discourse of ‘foreign interference’ as a sub-discourse in the category of ‘sovereignty’ is also often 
present in the government’s statements. As I mentioned in the sub-section 4.3.1., there is a discursive 
strategy of exclusion in the government’s narratives, especially in the diplomatic discourse. The 
diplomat’s statement above mentions “foreign political and financial circles” and “some partners” 
that the government accuses for destabilising Burundi. These probably refer to Burundi’s creditors, 
especially the European Union which has cut its financial aid and imposed sanctions on Burundi. Two 
weeks before the interview, the European Parliament had also passed a resolution condemning human 
rights violations in Burundi. 
The comments of three social media activists, in the discussion after a Facebook post of SOS Médias 
Burundi about the demonstrations demanding UN’s human rights investigators in Burundi to leave, 
illustrate the discursive battle about conceptualising the Burundian political crisis either in terms of 
‘foreign interference’ or ‘legality’: 
They are perfectly right are crooks and killers they frankly have to quit the country – – these members think 
that they can divide us we are more united than ever we will mobilise ourselves so that these idiots so-
called members of commission and EU agents have to quit the Burundian territory 
(Abdon Senen Nkinahamira in a discussion on SOS Médias Burundi’s Facebook wall, 8.10.2016 
(translation from French)) 
 
Burundi is not an island where the bush fighters can lead the Burundians like in their bush we said NO to 
the 3rd term of Pierre Nkurunziza that’s all. Whether they demonstrate or not obeying the laws of our country 
falling more into chaos. – – 
(Joseph Dondogori, 8.10.2016 (translation from French)) 
 
They give the opinion of their boss in order to be payed. But the majority that did not demonstrate reclaims 
justice!!! 
(Nzeyimana Bernard, 8.10.2016 (translation from French)) 
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The first person commenting in this narrative with a multiple tellership defends the government 
camp’s position and conceptualises the situation within the discourses of ‘unity’ and ‘foreign 
interference. He delegitimises the UN investigators by discursive derogation (Van Dijk, 2006a, p. 
126), labelling them as “idiots” and “agents” of the European Union. The post of the second narrator, 
a member of the former armed opposition group Front Patriotique de Libération [Patriotic Liberation 
Front], falls under a counter-discourse of ‘legality’ and ‘militarism’, representing Nkurunziza and 
CNDD-FDD as “bush fighters”, a term that evokes the party’s rebel group past. The last comment, 
by a diaspora-based Burundian, follows the discourses of ‘clientelism and corruption’ and ‘legality’. 
Some civil society representatives in the Inter-Burundian dialogue session indicate the foreign 
interference as a reason for the Burundian political crisis. 
As we can notice, the crisis that we live is due to the implication of certain foreign countries: Rwanda, 
Belgium and France. I think that in addition to the internal dialogue, there also has to be negotiations with 
these countries so that they tell us why they intrude into the Burundian crisis. 
(A female speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, ONACOM association) 
 
There has to be love for the fatherland. People have to devote themselves, people have to work. One cannot 
say that one loves her country and that you do nothing for this country. There has to be mutual respect, 
truth has to be promoted in a regular manner. – – We underestimate ourselves on the international level. 
We have an inferiority complex vis-à-vis others. In international relations, we have to know which example 
we should take and which not. 
(A female speaker at the CNDI dialogue session, CAFOB association) 
 
The speaker from the relief association ONACOM follows the government’s narrative about other 
countries interfering in Burundi’s crisis and emphasises Burundi’s sovereignty. The statement of the 
member of the CAFOB association belongs to the discourses of ‘patriotism’ and ‘sovereignty’ 
promoted by the government and she calls for Burundians to have a higher self-esteem. 
In conclusion, the clash of the ‘legality’ and the ‘rule of law’ discourses constitutes a radical 
disagreement between the two camps. It can be expressed with the following statements: 
| ‘The Burundian people and courts have given the president the right to a third term. 
‘The president has already completed two terms and the third term is illegal.’ | 
 
The government’s position, presented first, connects the ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ discourses. 
The second, the position of the opposition-civil society camp, represents the issue with the ‘legality’ 
discourse. The opposition and civil society interpret the question of the third term from a 
constitutional point of view, whereas the government legitimises it with the popular will expressed 
in the presidential and legislative elections – which the opposition boycotted – and with the ruling of 
a Burundian court. 
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4.4.2. Implications for the dialogue 
One of the conceptualisations of dialogue in the current crisis, within the political framework, is that 
there should be international pressure on the government to either force it to step down or to negotiate. 
The opposition’s ‘external pressure’ discourse, which legitimises the need for a foreign intervention 
to Burundi, is a counter-discourse for the government’s dominant narrative of ‘sovereignty’. The 
CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye calls for the UN Security Council to apply the Chapter 7 
which would enable the use of military force in Burundi. He considers it to be a “moral duty” of the 
United Nations. 
Why do not we want to do the same in Burundi that was done in the Gambia? Because the CEDEAO did 
very good things, they ousted Yahya Jammeh, they respected the Gambian popular will. Why is it so 
complicated to do the same thing here? Because we are living the same situations with the difference that 
today there is a drama, there is blood, there is a dispute of blood that is going on. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
Cimpaye refers to the events of January 2017 when the President of the Gambia who was forced to 
step aside by the regional organisation CEDEAO which had threatened the president with military 
intervention. Cimpaye legitimises the need for an intervention with the violence in Burundi. 
There is also the discourse of ‘external pressure’ underlying the civil society activist’s comments. He 
argues that foreign leverage is needed in order to solve the political crisis by negotiating. 
– – it is the responsibility of the international community to put pressure on the current government by 
saying: “you are forced to listen to the others”. 
 
We know well that even the military pressure always ends with… on the negotiation table. Because that is 
where the power is taken by force. So in Burundi, either the international community will wait for 
violence until people negotiate after the violence, – – years of war will be added. Or they will put the 
whole package, push them to dialogue. That is what we hoped for but the Obama administration left 
without being able to do it. – – And today with Trump we do not know what will happen. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
According to the civil society representative, the “international community” should be in charge of 
putting pressure on the government to dialogue. He legitimises using the threat of a foreign 
intervention in creating pressure with the possibility of protraction of the conflict. The activist 
considers that the United States under Obama’s presidency could have used leverage on the 
Burundian government but that did not happen. 
There is also a historical narrative that creates pressure for the government to dialogue. An argument 
emerging from both opposition and civil society actors is that Nkurunziza came to power through 
negotiations, so he should now be ready to negotiate himself. This discourse can be named as the 
discourse of ‘negotiated legitimacy’. 
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– – Nkurunziza personally has to know that he is resultant of negotiations. He had taken up the arms, he 
was condemned to death at the time, and nevertheless they negotiated with him, they negotiated with him, 
the transitional government at the time negotiated with him. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
Cimpaye refers to the negotiations between the transitional government and the armed movements, 
including CNDD-FDD, that brought an end to the Burundian Civil War (see section 2.2.). Nkurunziza 
had been condemned to death during the war for having laid mines but received amnesty during the 
peace negotiations (Caslin, 2015). The Brussels-based journalist also brings up the negotiations in 
2003 in order to justify the need for the government to accept inclusive dialogue. 
This type of legitimisation is based on the Burundian conflict parties’ shared cultural knowledge of 
the country’s political history. It uses the structure of signification, as indicated by Jabri in Giddens’s 
theory of structuration (see sub-section 4.2.4.), that relates Nkurunziza’s past as a participant of 
negotiations to the current situation and creates a symbolic order and a discourse that all the actors 
acknowledge. 
In addition to the regional dialogue process led by the East African Community, the government has 
justified its willingness to dialogue by organising the national Inter-Burundian dialogue which was 
introduced in the sub-section 4.2.1. The government legitimises this process with the need to include 
all the Burundians in the dialogue. The Brussels-based diplomat argues that the political opposition 
and civil society are not representative of the whole nation: 
The approach of the government and of the other institutions is that the radical opposition and a part of the 
civil society is a part of the Burundian people. If we have to look for an answer, answers, a solution, the 
whole Burundi has to be involved. That is why the government said “let us ask every Burundian, or 
representatives of Burundians, how they perceive this crisis”. – – 
– – People expressed themselves with an open heart. There were no taboos. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat conceptualises the dialogue as open and inclusive. Contrarily, the Inter-Burundian 
dialogue is criticised by the civil society representative and the opposition spokesman for not enabling 
the participants to express themselves freely. The civil society representative conceptualises the issue 
in terms of the discourse of ‘authoritarianism’: 
It is organised internally, it is organised by the government, the people did not dare express themselves 
freely and most of all … the questions that were asked were leading, in order to come to conclusions that 
the government had prepared since the beginning. We saw the big conclusion of this dialogue: the Arusha 
Agreement is not favoured any more, the limit of two presidential terms is not wanted any more. … So this 
thing of internal dialogue is just a dialogue, it is a thing organised by the government. So we knew the 
questions, we knew the conclusions beforehand. And that is what happened. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
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Well, it is not a dialogue, it is a monologue. A dialogue is between people… while this cinema done 
internally – – is a monologue because these are people who are prepared in advance and who have been 
given ideas to pronounce. And in this monologue, the objective was to say, it is to come to a conclusion 
that the Constitution has to be amended, that the terms for a President of the Republic have to be unlimited. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
Both representatives refer to a report by the Inter-Burundian Dialogue Commission CNDI published 
in August 2016. It suggested the removal of the term limits and the primacy of the Constitution over 
the Arusha Agreement, which would enable the removal of the power-sharing quotas (RFI, 2016a). 
The conceptualisations of the Inter-Burundian dialogue differ again radically between the government 
and the opposition-civil society camp. Whereas the government conceptualises the internal dialogue 
as inclusive and providing the participants with freedom of expression, the opposition and civil 
society actors conceptualise it as “pre-determined” and as a “cinema”. 
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4.5. Discourses on ethnicity 
This section discusses the conceptualisations of the role of ethnicity in Burundi’s current political 
crisis and examines the research question How have the parties conceptualised the question of 
ethnicity in the conflict? I already discussed the role of ethnicity in Burundi historically and as a 
background factor in the current crisis in the section 2.1. Ethnic quotas are included in the Burundian 
institutional arrangements (see section 2.3.) and ethnicity is discussed openly in the public sphere. 
Against this backdrop, it was not surprising to perceive elements of ethnicity in the local conflict 
narratives. 
I specifically asked my interviewees about the possibility of ethnicisation in the crisis and about the 
risk of a genocide. However, the topic of ethnicity also came up spontaneously in the interviews of 
the journalist and the opposition activist. 
The Burundian government officially denies the role of ethnicity in the conflict. Instead, it emphasises 
the ‘unity’ of Burundians. In a speech on the Day of the National Unity Charter, reported by the 
media, President Nkurunziza accused the Belgian coloniser of having disseminated ethnic divisions 
in Burundi: 
“Certainly the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed in Burundi well before the colonisation. But the former 
[a decree by the Belgian King Albert in 1925 I on the reorganisation of administration in the Belgian 
colonies] still radically changed their substance with divisional objectives and diverted them from their real 
interpretation.” (President Pierre Nkurunziza, Iwacu-burundi.org, 7.2.2017) 
 
A member of a civil society association for the ethnic Twa minority follows the same discourse of 
‘colonial manipulation’ in his speech at the Inter-Burundian dialogue session: 
We have to return into the history of Burundi and analyse together with those who colonised us. They left 
something in the country. 
(A male speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, UNIPROBU association) 
 
A theme that emerges from the data from both the government and opposition-civil society narratives 
is the role of ethnicity in the Burundian security apparatus. In the security sector reform that followed 
the end of the Civil War, former Hutu rebels of CNDD-FDD were integrated into the newly named 
army, Forces de Défense Nationale [National Defence Forces]. It was decided that they should 
constitute 40 per cent of the high administration and members of the former national Tutsi-dominated 
army FAB 60 percent, with ethnic parity on all the levels (Wilén, 2016b, p. 83). Furthermore, the 
whole security sector with the police and the intelligence services observes an ethnic balance between 
the Tutsi and the Hutu (section 2.3.). 
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On the government side, the Brussels-based diplomat delegitimises the suggestions of ethnicity 
playing a role in the conflict and the possibility of a genocide breaking out as “manipulation” and 
incitement to a foreign intervention in Burundi. He argues that the institutional power-sharing 
arrangements guarantee the representation of all the ethnic groups and prevent any ethnic conflict: 
Me, for example, I am a Tutsi, would I give weapons to people who will kill people of my ethnicity? It is 
inconceivable. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
On the contrary, the diplomat says that the ethnic quotas should be reviewed in order to share the 
power more equally in terms of the size of the ethnic groups. According to estimations, the Tutsi 
represent 14 per cent of the Burundian population and the Hutu 85 per cent. The diplomat argues that 
some of the stipulations of the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution on Tutsi over-representation 
in public institutions are not valid any more. He compares this aspect to the United States, taking the 
security sector as an example: 
You have the Blacks who constitute about 12–13 per cent of the population. And the rest of the Americans 
85 per cent. Is it possible to find an explanation, a moral, ethical, democratic justification that would say 
“the Blacks have been so excluded, for example, that now, in order to attain peace, in order to have 
development, we will make 50 per cent of the political positions in the army, in the police, reserved for the 
Blacks”. If you do that in the United States, the other Americans will revolt, wouldn’t they? – – We cannot 
continue to operate under such a system because it could generate more significant conflicts than before.  
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
Despite denying the role of ethnicity in the crisis, the diplomat asserts that ethnic quotas should be 
reviewed in order to avoid “more significant conflicts” in the future, legitimising his position with 
conflict prevention. By comparing the situation of Burundi to the United States, the diplomat seeks 
external legitimisation for his argument. Furthermore, he legitimises his position with the “evaluation 
of the Burundian society”, the “geopolitical environment” and the recent entry of Burundi in the East 
African Community which would, according to him, require reviewing some stipulations. 
This discourse of ‘ethnic rebalancing’ implies that the government attempts to ameliorate the situation 
of the Hutu majority during the crisis. The discrepancy with the views of the opposition and civil 
society is that the government seems to perceive the position of the Hutu majority as threatened while 
the opposition and civil society actors more often indicate the Tutsi minority as being persecuted by 
the regime. All in all, the discourses of ‘unity’, ‘information war’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘institutions’ 
underlie the government’s statements with regard to the question of ethnicity.  
In the civil society-opposition camp, there are in general two kinds of interpretations of the role of 
ethnicity in the crisis. One of them is that there is a ‘man hunt’ of the Tutsi. This discourse is 
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sometimes connected with the warning that a genocide might break out in Burundi. The alternative 
conceptualisation is that the government targets all those who oppose it, regardless of the ethnicity. 
The discourse of a ‘man hunt’ emerges many times in the data with regard to the assassinations of 
Tutsi within the Burundian army. The following quotes by two opposition activists illustrate this 
discourse: 
Nowadays, there are targeted assassinations of essentially young Tutsi, of essentially the ex-FAB, the ex-
Burundian Army members, the majority of whom were Tutsi. We see that these soldiers and military 
officers are arrested, executed exactly because they are Tutsi. We also see it in the ways of operating of the 
militia Imbonerakure that chants and shouts “we will eliminate them, the Tutsi”. 
(Charles Nditije, President, opposition party Uprona, in exile in Belgium, France24 documentary Burundi: 
Fear and Exile 20.1.2017) 
 
The threat of a genocide is hovering on the country because when the institutions on the top, the head of 
the Senate, the head of the National Assembly, the Military Chief of Staff, when they unleash a campaign 
of ethnic hatred officially, when the Military Chief of Staff dares to gather only a part of the army and 
gathers only the Hutu component without the Tutsi knowing, when the man hunt of the Tutsi is done in the 
defence forces of security, the risk is high – – that a genocide will happen. Because such lessons are given 
by the authorities, the state officers, there is a permanent danger. A minor thing is enough for the genocide 
to break out. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
 
As I mentioned in the section 1.3., Daley and Popplewell (2016) have argued that ethnicity could 
become a dividing issue in the current crisis because the government has marginalised the Tutsi in 
public positions. Daley and Chemouni (2015) also mentioned the possibility of the Tutsi becoming 
scapegoats. Both Nditije and Cimpaye reinforce these narratives by describing the targeting of the 
Tutsi in the army. Furthermore, Nditije argues that the CNDD-FDD youth militia Imbonerakure has 
genocidal ideas. 
The ‘risk of genocide’ discourse has to some extent emerged from international organisations. The 
international NGO FIDH has warned about the risk of a genocide in a report (see FIDH, 2016). The 
report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi UNIIB from September 2016 also 
mentioned the risk by stating: “Given the country’s history, the danger of the crime of genocide also 
looms large” (UNHRC, 2016). Cimpaye refers to the latter in the interview. In addition to Burundi’s 
own past massacres, the genocide discourse has an all the more threatening connotation in Burundi 
because of the recent memory of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. 
There are also opposite examples about the ‘risk of genocide’ discourse, such as this tweet by a person 
who supports the government’s positions in his tweets: 
 
#Burundi almost all the #Burundi –an private medias are led by the Tutsi, are they preparing for a genocide? 
I address this to #ICC 
(Gitare Bruce Marcel, @gbrucel on Twitter, 7.10.2016 (translation from French)) 
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This person suggests that the Tutsi would be planning a genocide against the Hutu. He refers to the 
International Criminal Court which had decided to investigate human right violations by 
Nkurunziza’s regime and from which Burundi decided to withdraw in October 2016 (Kaneza, 2016). 
In Giddens’s structuration theory, warnings are part of signification in a conflict situation. Cimpaye’s 
comment about a minor incident being able to launch a genocide follows the discourse of ‘risk of 
genocide’ and is a warning intended to the international actors. The ethnicity-related ‘risk of 
genocide’ discourse appears in my data a few times but is not as recurrent as the political and legal 
conceptualisations of the conflict (see section 4.4.). For example, the Brussels-based civil society 
activist considers ethnicity to be only a tool in political violence: 
 
For years, the Burundian leaders have always used ethnicity to stay in power. – – But the reality is that in 
Burundi nowadays, the government lashes out against all the ethnic groups together, against all those who 
object to it. – – Everybody tries to use it [ethnicity] for their advantage. If we watch closer, we know what 
has happened in the region, that is why the people alert by saying “caution, take caution, you risk to end up 
to a genocide”. But for now, we can say that they are massacres – – of political nature and that ethnicity is 
used for political purposes.  
(Interview of a Burundian civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
This statement belongs to the discursive category of ‘information war’ and the representation of 
ethnicity is that it is a tool for advancing political goals. The civil society activist attributes this 
manipulation both to the government and to Tutsi extremists that he calls “nostalgic of the earlier 
governments”. This probably refers to the former Tutsi president Pierre Buyoya’s rule in the 1980s 
and 90s. The activist admits that the risk of genocide may potentially exist but does not think that it 
is actively being planned. As a counter-narrative to the ‘man hunt of Tutsi’ discourse, the activist 
mentions that Nkurunziza’s government has actually killed more Hutu than Tutsi due to the repression 
of the members of the FNL opposition party, which means “tens of thousands” of Hutu. 
The discourse of ‘manipulation’ also comes up in a Facebook discussion after a post of the media 
outlet SOS Médias Burundi about anti-UN protests in Bujumbura: 
Hutu people still manipulated by a dictator with no faith or conscience. Nkurunziza is a cancer for Burundi. 
Hutu people, wake up and quit the manipulation of this Burundian Bokassa fast!!! ENOUGH!!! 
(Tite Kubushishi in a discussion on SOS Médias Burundi’s Facebook wall, 8.10.2016) 
 
The narrator of this post, a Burundian, compares Nkurunziza to the former dictator of Central African 
Republic, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, and suggests that Nkurunziza manipulates the Hutu, his own ethnic 
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group.3 The lexical metaphor of “cancer” represents the president as an illness that has spread all over 
the country. 
Léonidas Hatungimana, the former spokesman of President Nkurunziza and the president of the 
opposition party PPD-Girijambo, conceptualises the role of ethnicity within the ‘power’ discourse 
and argues that the government wants to accomplish a “revolution” and concentrate the power in the 
hands of the Hutu ethnic group. This is, however, the only time that this conceptualisation comes up 
in the data: 
The revolution had to be finalised. The revolution was to put aside the Arusha Accords so that the quotas 
would not be discussed anymore. So, to have the power in the hands of only Hutu instead of having power 
shared with the Tutsi. So, that is, a kind of revenge. In the previous years it was the Tutsi ethnic group that 
ruled, they said, so we have to achieve a situation in which only the Hutu rule. 
(Léonidas Hatungimana, France24 documentary Burundi: Fear and Exile 20.1.2017) 
 
As was discussed in the sub-section 3.5.1., narratives construct the reality and can provide two 
competing versions of it in situations of conflict. This is apparent in two Facebook posts that narrate 
the first demonstrations against Nkurunziza’s third term in Bujumbura on April 26, 2015 very 
differently. One of the posts gives an ethnic connotation to the events while the other one narrates 
them within the discourse of ‘state-led violence’. 
President Nkurunziza’s media and communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe’s narrative partly follows 
the ‘security’ discourse and its sub-discourse of ‘violent political insurgency’ that names the 
government’s political opponents as insurgents against a legitimate government. However, there is 
an underlying discourse of ‘ethnicity’ represented with the discourse of ‘history’ in the post. This is 
an excerpt of it: 
 
Sunday morning, called by civil society activists but mobilised, especially, by the medias, several onlookers 
[badauds] boo, whistle, take to certain streets of the capital, especially in the quartiers of Musaga, 
Mutakura, Cibitoke, Ngagara and Nyakabiga. – – A rain of stones, barricades erected here and there, with 
makeshift material, burned tyres, a setting that reminds of the very bewildering sight of the dead cities in 
1994 after the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye. – – This forced the police to take out its artillery, heavily 
wet with water cannons and smoke-filled with tear gas, … By way of a reminder, many fellow citizens 
were killed and/or burned alive by young insurgents with the nicknames of “sans-échec” [without failure], 
“sans défaite” [without defeat], “sans-amour” [without love], to name a few, in these quartiers which 
were today the torchbearers of the insurrection.  – – The country laments a casualty, then two, then three, 
very regrettable innocent victims and even several policemen are injured. 
(Facebook post by Willy Nyamitwe, 27.4.2015, translated from French) 
  
                                                 
3 Pierre Nkurunziza was a child from a mixed marriage, his father was Hutu and mother Tutsi (Caslin, 2015). The 
father’s ethnicity is passed on to the children in mixed marriages. 
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In the first sentence, Nyamitwe mentions five specific quartiers that are known to have an ethnic 
Tutsi majority (Immigration Board of Canada, 2002). He draws a connection to history by referring 
to the inter-ethnic killings of 1994 after the Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was killed in a coup 
d’état by the Tutsi-dominated army. The sans-échec and sans-défaite mentioned later in the post were 
Tutsi-led urban militias in the Burundian Civil War (Lemarchand, 1996, xviii). These references add 
an ethnic connotation to the events. 
Other interesting discursive features of the post are lexical choices, such as using the expression “this 
forced the police to take out its artillery”, which legitimises the action of the police forces with the 
necessity to topple an illegitimate uprising. Furthermore, the ‘security’ discourse used here 
emphasises the injuries of policemen and undermines the seriousness of the insurgents as “onlookers” 
that were easy to mobilise by the civil society and the media. 
An opposite narrative about the same events comes from the civil society activist Pacifique 
Nininahazwe. His post follows the discourse of ‘state-led violence’ which was examined more in 
detail in the sub-section 4.3.1. The post starts with an appeal to Burundians: 
My dear fellow citizens, let’s not give in to provocation. They want to drag us into violence but let’s keep 
our dignity. 
 
The beginning of the post contains an us/them polarisation and an appeal to a value that Nininahazwe 
assumes is shared by those Burundians who are against the government: dignity. Another discursive 
strategy used in the post is exclusion: the reader has to infer that “they” refers to the Burundian 
government. The post, an excerpt of which is presented here, continues with a description of the 
events of the previous day: 
 
Yesterday, the Burundian authorities, the police and the militia of the government multiplied acts of 
provocation. In Musaga, a policeman fired at a citizen right in front of his home. In Mutakura, a policeman 
fired at a 15-year old youngster who had put his hands up – – The office of MSD in Cibitoke was pillaged 
by Imbonerakure in the presence of the police. – – Groups of security services led by Bertin Gahungu would 
be assigned to pursue certain civil society figures: Vital Nshimirimana, Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa and 
myself. In the evening, citizens of Mutakura were attacked and robbed at their homes by unknown people 
in police uniforms. – – In the same time the presidency of the Republic, via its main communication advisor 
Willy Nyamitwe and Rema Fm, continues the manipulation. They insist on the demonstration sites of 
yesterday (a way to give a certain ethnic connotation to the refusal of the third mandate). 
(Facebook post by Pacifique Nininahazwe, 27.4.2015, translated from French) 
 
The latter part of the post mentions more explicitly the forces committing violent acts. This narrative 
presents the narrated event as violence by state actors against protesters, opposition and civil society. 
The narrator makes the lexical choice of using the word “provocation” in order to give the events a 
political connotation and to make a statement about the government and police forces as the initiators 
of the violence. 
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In the rest of the post, Nininahazwe lists several events in order to prove that the violence is committed 
by state forces. Finally, he refers to Nyamitwe, probably to the post that was analysed above, and to 
a private radio channel within the discourse of ‘information war’ and mentions the “ethnic 
connotation” of the demonstrations that he disagrees with. All in all, the discourse of ‘state-led 
violence’ represents the demonstrations as justified and the demonstrators as victims. 
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4.6. Discourses on economy 
Economy is conceptualised by several actors as a background factor of the political crisis but also as 
an element of solution. This section addresses the sub-research question How have the conflict parties 
discussed economy in the conflict? The main discourses that emerge from this theme in my data are 
the ‘interests’ and the ‘economic development’ discourses. 
 
4.6.1. Interests discourse 
The government’s discourses of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘foreign interference’ were already discussed in 
the section 4.4. Related to that theme, the Burundian diplomat in Brussels conceptualises foreign 
economic interests as a factor explaining the current political crisis. He refers to Burundi’s mining 
law of 2013 which reduced the length of mineral exploitation permits of international companies and 
made them pay a bigger share of the income to the state. 
It is the oversized appetite of certain multinational companies that puts down the new mining law. – – So, 
the multinational companies do not want that, and as a consequence they are tempted to… favour operating 
regime changes – – Which explains that the tensions do not necessarily have local origins but there is also 
the external that comes along, all the foreign interests that will fuel – – certain tensions. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat also attributes the failure to implement certain reconstruction programs after the end of 
the Burundian Civil War to the foreign donors. He considers the ensuing economic frustration to be 
one of the economic causes of the current political crisis. 
This hope [after the Arusha Agreement] was nevertheless diminished by the – – lack of respect for financial 
engagements of some of our partners. Because in Arusha, – – there was a meeting of the major donors who 
promised many things to reconstruct the country and if that had been realised, there would have been 
economic growth, a redistribution of income, and that would have helped to stabilise the country. As we 
got a lot of promises but very few achievements, that weakened a lot the process of returning to stability 
and to peace, and in my opinion created a breeding ground for the current crisis. – – The former combatants 
who were demobilised and then there was no program to reintegrate them into the economic society, which 
made some of them become for example thieves, or to go to fuel other rebel movements. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
The end of the narrative also refers to the problems in implementing the reintegration phase in 
Burundi’s post-Civil War DDR [disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration] program that, according 
to the diplomat, destabilised Burundi. 
The opposition and civil society present a counter-discourse to the dominant ‘foreign interests’ 
discourse. They conceptualise the Burundian crisis in terms of the discourse of ‘clientelism and 
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corruption’ of the government, as a consequence of people in power seeking personal interests. The 
Brussels-based journalist and civil society activist consider that corruption is one of the central 
reasons for the crisis: 
 
– – essentially, it is a crisis connected to the search for individual interests. – – And President Nkurunziza 
but also those around him, the close ones, do not want to let go of the power, they are afraid of losing here 
and there the advantages, the mining contracts that they have signed with the foreign companies here and 
there, but also they do not want to quit the power because they are afraid of the crimes that they have 
committed in the country while they have been in power since 2005. 
(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
– – A course for enrichment seized the country. – – a government came, they got rich very fast, you see, a 
system of corruption, because in reality it is essentially – – a question of money. 
– – Today, we are again in a situation like the beginning of the 90s. – – They are doing the same thing that 
they reproached others for. To be corrupt, to kill people. So, all of this, it is reproaches that were done 
against the regime of Buyoya. 
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017) 
 
The civil society activist speaks about the beginning of the 2000s and the rise of the CNDD-FDD 
party (see section 2.4.), as well as the wrongdoings of the Tutsi-led government of Pierre Buyoya in 
the 1980s and 90s. He suggests that those in power always commit the same mistakes. The journalist, 
on the other hand, refers to a clientelist system in which the CNDD-FDD party members have 
gathered personal advantages and signed lucrative deals with international companies. Jobbins and 
Ahitungiye (2015) and Van Acker (2015) have argued that there is a system of political patronage in 
place in Burundi (see section 1.3.). Both narratives connect clientelism and patronage to the current 
political crisis. 
The ‘clientelism and corruption’ discourse is also represented in some social media comments, like 
this angry Facebook comment by a diaspora-based Burundian after a post on the SOS Médias Burundi 
platform about the demonstrations led by local and national authorities against the presence of UN’s 
human rights investigators in Burundi: 
They have nothing to do, these idiots!!!!!, where are the kids of these authorities? They are in Europe, in 
USA, in Canada in good schools, and you miserable brain-washed who each get a beer, you will go back 
home with this beer, work instead of sitting in front of the embassies, these authorities look for their 
advantages and they will give you a beer and you will go home with this primus !!!!! 
(Rita Nahimana in a discussion on SOS Médias Burundi’s Facebook wall 8.10.2016 (translation from 
French)) 
 
The commenter mentions the “advantages” that, according to Van Acker (2015), members of the 
CNDD-FDD party get, including for example university grants to study abroad (p. 6). The post also 
criticises the “manipulation” of ordinary citizens by authorities. 
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4.6.2. Economic development discourse 
The government narratives include the discourse of ‘economic development’ which posits that 
developing and diversifying Burundi’s economy would be one of the solutions to the political crisis. 
According to the Brussels-based Burundian diplomat, one of the problems related to the economy is 
the attractiveness of the political sector as an employer in Burundi. 
– – It is the development of the private sector because that makes it possible to manage in the same time 
the political class which are not in the institutions. Their leaders are like unemployed, they do not have 
income. So that, that puts them in a very uncomfortable situation. And if the private sector is very 
developed, that enables creating jobs in the private sector so that the state would not be the biggest 
employer, that the politics would not be the best sector, the best paying sector. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat also connects the theme of economic diversification to the need for an education reform 
in order to create employment opportunities for the youth: 
Because one of the origins of the tensions are the youth who see with the new information technologies 
what is happening elsewhere. It aspires sensibly that it should have such basic services. And, since the 
education sector is not organised so that the youth could find work and create jobs in all the sectors other 
than the agricultural sector or the public service, it follows that from the employment point of view it is 
very limited and so the unemployment will not be curbed easily. 
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017) 
 
The diplomat conceptualises the tensions in terms of unemployment and the need for reform 
expressed by the youth. The frustrations related to economic marginalisation and lack of economic 
growth were also mentioned by Daley and Popplewell (2016, see section 1.3.) as factors behind the 
current conflict. 
The governmental discourses of ‘economic development’ and ‘education’ are echoed by many of the 
civil society representatives speaking at an Inter-Burundian dialogue session. One of them, 
representing a relief organisation, connects the economy to the problem of “exploitation of the youth”: 
The youth needs to be mobilised and be given a place because it is used in the various crimes in Burundi. 
So there has to be an employment policy for the youth but especially also programs for fighting against 
poverty in Burundi. So that all Burundians would not turn towards politics but that they would know that 
there are other sectors that can create means for Burundians to earn their living. 
(A female speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, ONACOM association) 
 
The vulnerability of the youth is raised in several speeches. A demand for a “civic education” for 
Burundians is made, concerning diverse issues such as the elections and general values. The 
representative of an association for repatriated Burundians justifies the need for civic education with 
the youth’s proneness to political manipulation: 
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There should be civic or citizen education because the politicians in Burundi exploit the youth as tools in 
order to fulfil their personal interests. Politicians come to disturb the peace and democracy in Burundi and 
manipulate the youth without civic education. I do not only speak about opposition politicians, but also 
those of the government in Burundi like in Africa exploit the youth. 
(A male speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, ARDID association) 
 
As a counter-discourse, the opposition conceptualises the current government as responsible for the 
bad state of the Burundian economy, which it sees as a background factor of the current crisis. This 
comment by the spokesman of the CNARED alliance, who was a spokesman for the transitional 
government after the end of the Civil War, illustrates this discourse: 
[After the Civil War] we thought that we would have new bases from there on – – that we would start a 
path of rapid economic growth, that we would start the development of the country. – – I tell you that [now] 
all the economic indicators are red. – – So I tell you that it is a disappointment, a total disappointment, a 
total disappointment. That is why I am so angry at Nkurunziza, because he brought down completely all 
the efforts that had been made to put Burundi back on the track. 
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to analyse the narratives and conceptualisations that the Burundian 
government, opposition and civil society actors have used when they have discussed violence and 
dialogue during the political crisis of 2015–17. I analysed the question with the theories of radical 
disagreement and structuration and with the methods of discourse and narrative analysis. The central 
research question was to identify the discrepancies in the conceptualisations of violence and dialogue 
by the different actors and to analyse how the differences explain the current tense political situation 
in Burundi. In the preceding chapter, I analysed and discussed the data and provided answers to my 
sub-research questions. In the first part of this chapter, I will conclude the study, discuss the findings 
and provide answers to the main research question. In the second part, I will present a suggestion for 
future research and an estimation about the future of the conflict. 
 
5.1. Findings and discussion 
The apparent discrepancies in the discourses on violence by the Burundian opposition and civil 
society as opposed to those by the government demonstrate that there is a radical disagreement 
between the two conflict parties. Ramsbotham (2010) states that among discourses of violence those 
that emerge from the “discourse of violent repression” and from the “discourse of violent resistance” 
are prominent (p. 218). One of the clashes of discourses is in Burundi’s case between the discourse 
of ‘normality’ and that of ‘state-led violence’. The government camp has conceptualised the violence 
in Burundi recently as isolated attacks and terrorism, whereas the opposition-civil society camp has 
mostly conceptualised it as state-led violent repression of those who oppose the government. This 
clash of discourses constitutes a radical disagreement. However, the civil society narratives also 
mention isolated attacks, which illustrates the complexity of the Burundian conflict. Furthermore, the 
discourse of ‘violent resistance’, mostly present in the statements of the opposition alliance 
CNARED, considers violence to be legitimised in opposing the government. 
The discourse of ‘state-led violence’ has been present in the narratives of the opposition and the civil 
society since 2015, whereas the government discourse of ‘normality’ is most strongly present in the 
narratives from 2016 and 2017. The government’s narrative has shifted from describing the events as 
‘violent political insurrection’ in the beginning of the anti-third term demonstrations in April 2015 to 
emphasising that the situation is ‘normal’ in Burundi. However, the government’s communication 
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advisor argued already during the coup attempt in May 2015 that the immediate situation in the 
country was normal. 
Jabri (1996) argues that conflict parties may use a strategy of manipulation of information on their 
intentions or external issues in order to achieve a favourable conflict outcome. The Burundian conflict 
parties have accused each other of this kind of manipulation, which is common in a conflict context, 
in addition to the intertwining of emotions and facts in radical disagreement (Ramsbotham, 2010). 
The discourse of ‘information war’, in the sense of accusing the adversary of manipulation, is present 
both in the government and the opposition-civil society narratives. However, this discourse is more 
typical to the government which refers with it both to the opposition and to external actors. 
The conceptualisation of inclusive dialogue as the ideal type of dialogue is shared by both conflict 
parties. However, the ‘normality’ discourse of the government has to some extent led it to a practice 
of refusing to dialogue. Furthermore, there is a deep radical disagreement between the parties about 
who is entitled to participate in the inclusive dialogue. The government discursively denies to 
dialogue with the ‘radicalised’ opposition that it considers to be ‘terrorists’ and participants of the 
May 2015 coup attempt, whereas the CNARED opposition alliance would like the dialogue to include 
all the different actors, along with the armed opposition groups. In addition, the ‘messiness of the 
dialogue’ is one important conceptualisation, since the blurred boundaries between the political 
opposition and civil society have made it more complicated to define who the dialogue participants 
would be. 
The radical disagreement about the dialogue participants has been an immediate cause for the current 
standstill in the formal East African Community -led dialogue process. However, the deeper reasons 
that partly explain the current tensions between the conflict parties are connected to a discursive 
divide between the ‘normality’ discourse and the ‘state-led violence’ discourse: the very definition of 
the essence of the violence in Burundi. 
The narratives presented at the internal Inter-Burundian dialogue session which I analysed, were the 
most difficult to categorise since they included some conceptualisations that were not mentioned by 
any other actors, such as the need for ‘civic education’. This reveals something about the complexity 
of the context: participating in a dialogue session organised by the government has very probably led 
to self-censorship regarding at least the most critical opinions about the government. On the other 
hand, it tells about the diversity of opinions within the Burundian society. All in all, the narratives of 
the Inter-Burundian dialogue session mostly followed closely the official government positions. 
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There is a discrepancy in the conflict parties’ conceptualisations of the internal Inter-Burundian 
dialogue process. The government has considered it to be an opportunity for ordinary Burundians to 
express their opinions on the conflict, whereas the opposition and the civil society have criticised the 
dialogue for being a ‘monologue’ of like-minded people with pre-determined conclusions. 
The ways in which the actors refer to the legal and political aspects differs. The opposition-civil 
society camp refers more to ‘legality’ as a value and to the international political institutions. The 
government, on the other hand, mostly speaks within a ‘rule of law’ discourse that justifies positions 
by referring to Burundi’s own institutions and judicial bodies. With regard to international actors, the 
government emphasises Burundi’s ‘sovereignty’ and objects to ‘foreign interference’ into its internal 
affairs especially by the European Union and the United States. This discourse has got considerable 
support from the social media narratives and the Inter-Burundian dialogue participants, although the 
latter were not completely free to present critical opinions due to the above-mentioned reasons. 
The government has invoked the role of Burundi’s judiciary system as focal in ruling on President 
Nkurunziza’s right to a third term, one of the immediate causes of the current crisis. Furthermore, its 
‘democracy’ discourse emphasises the election results of 2015 and the ‘popular will’ of Burundians 
to elect Nkurunziza as president for the third time. 
Concerning legal documents, both the government and the opposition-civil society camp refer to the 
Constitution of Burundi and the 2000 Arusha Agreement as tools for national reconciliation and 
political regulation when they legitimise their positions. The opposition and civil society actors 
cherish the Arusha Agreement the most and accuse the government of violating it in the third-term 
question, whereas the government discourse has underlined the need to review especially the ethnic 
power-sharing quotas defined in the Agreement. The narrative of an opposition leader suggests this 
to be a way to concentrate power in the hands of the Hutu elite. 
Furthermore, the CNARED opposition alliance legitimises the use of violence in the coup attempt of 
May 2015 as an attempt to re-establish ‘constitutional order’ by overthrowing an “illegal” 
government. The ‘authoritarianism’ discourse of the opposition and the civil society representative’s 
conceptualisation of a ‘system of violence’ established by the ruling party CNDD-FDD delegitimise 
the government’s position in power. 
There is a clash between the opposition-civil society camp’s ‘legality’ and the government’s ‘rule of 
law’ discourses which constitutes a radical disagreement. The opposition-civil society camp considers 
Nkurunziza’s third term and the current government to be illegitimate, whereas the government 
considers itself to have been democratically elected by Burundians and the president’s third term to 
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have been validated by sovereign Burundian courts. These discrepancies in the conceptualisations 
partly explain why there is tension between the conflict parties. 
The ‘external pressure’ discourse, calling for a foreign intervention or for pressure on the government 
to negotiate, is a narrative that belongs to the diaspora-based opposition and civil society activists. 
This discourse is almost not at all present in the social media comments. The reason may be that those 
who oppose the government but remain in Burundi are afraid to voice demands for foreign 
intervention, but it is not possible to form such a generalisation based on this data. The ‘external 
pressure’ discourse is in radical disagreement with the government’s ‘sovereignty’ discourse, which 
provides one more explanation for the current deadlock in the Burundian conflict. 
There are different conceptualisations within the opposition-civil society camp about ethnicity 
playing a role in the conflict. Some narratives present the current crisis as a political conflict opposing 
the government and all those who oppose it, whereas others conceptualise that the government is 
‘hunting’ the Tutsi. This ‘Tutsi man hunt’ discourse is prominent among the opposition and the civil 
society, whereas the ‘risk of genocide’ discourse is emphasised less and has mostly been voiced by 
international NGOs. In the statements of the CNARED opposition alliance, the ‘risk of genocide’ 
narrative may be used as a warning, as suggested in the structuration theory, to draw international 
attention to the issue. On the other hand, the civil society representative’s more prudent interpretation 
of no immediate risk of genocide correlates better with the current situation of the conflict. 
The government and those who support its views conceptualise the role of ethnicity to be non-existent 
in the conflict and emphasise the ‘unity’ of Burundians. They consider the evoking of the ethnicity 
issue to be ‘manipulation’ by the opposition and international actors and sometimes connect ethnicity 
to colonialism. The question of ethnicity does not constitute a clear radical disagreement between the 
parties. 
The ‘economy’ discourse is shared by the government, opposition and the civil society. On the 
government side, this discourse is connected to the ‘foreign interference’ discourse so that the foreign 
economic interests are considered as playing a role in the conflict. The opposition-civil society camp, 
on the other hand, sees clientelism and corruption in the state structures as background factors of the 
current crisis. Economic development is presented by the government camp as a solution to the crisis, 
whereas the opposition considers the miserable state of the economy as its cause, attributable to the 
current government’s actions. 
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Based on all the different narratives both by the government, opposition and civil society, I conclude 
that Burundians interpret the recent events in the light of history. Historical narratives appear often 
and comparisons of current developments with the past are commonplace in the conceptualisations. 
However, these interpretations are used in differing ways to justify contrary points of view. This 
confirms what Ramsbotham’s (2010) radical disagreement theory argues about the fact/value 
distinction: conflict parties can justify things with the same principle but contrarily, in this case with 
historical principles. The former Burundian diplomat Félix Ndayisenga defines the issue well in my 
interview: “When there is an objective point of dissent, people exploit it with their subjectivity related 
to the past.” (Interview of Félix Ndayisenga, 31.1.2017) 
This research has given the parole to the local and diaspora-based politically active Burundians to 
interpret the political crisis in their country. These locally rooted findings of my research support the 
findings of some of the earlier research on the current political crisis. For example, the government 
camp’s conceptualisation of ‘manipulation’ and ‘information war’ by the opposition and foreign 
actors as a background factor of the crisis supports the findings of Purdeková (2017) about the 
Burundian government’s discourse of ‘unfounded fears’ and ‘rumours’ in explaining the outflow of 
refugees during the crisis. 
The core question that was posed earlier in this thesis was whether the dialogue between the 
Burundian conflict parties constitutes a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ as the theory of radical disagreement 
indicates. In conclusion, there is a radical disagreement between the government and the opposition-
civil society camp about defining the status of the current conflict as either in a state of ‘normality’ 
or as continuing ‘state-led repression’. The second radical disagreement is between the opposition-
civil society’s conceptualisation of the ‘illegality’ of the government and the president’s third term 
and the government’s conceptualisation of ‘sovereign, democratic and legal rule’. 
In terms of dialogue, there is a radical disagreement about defining who has the right to dialogue in 
the current conflict. Although inclusive dialogue is the stated objective of all the parties, the current 
interaction is conceptualised as a monologue by the opposition and civil society, and the government 
wants to limit its dialogue partners to those that it considers ‘the peaceful stakeholders’. Due to this 
radical disagreement between the parties, there is a deadlock in the conflict which reduces the 
interaction to a dialogue of the deaf. 
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5.2. Further research and the future of the conflict 
My study suggests that there are some differences between the discourses in the narratives of the 
locally-based Burundians and those that are part of the European diaspora. However, the scope of the 
study did not enable conducting a comprehensive study on the different views of the Burundian 
diaspora members. This point of view would deserve attention in further research. 
The themes that were almost exclusively present in the diaspora members’ narratives were on the 
opposition side the ‘external pressure’ discourse calling for foreign intervention and the ‘violent 
resistance’ discourse. The references to international legal principles and violations of human rights 
were present only in the diaspora members’ narratives. On the government side, the discourse of 
‘religion’ was used most extensively by President Nkurunziza when he addressed a local audience 
for example in his tweets. In addition, religion was mostly mentioned in the ordinary Burundians’ 
social media comments. It is therefore clearly a local discourse. 
More research would be necessary to identify the role of the diaspora in shaping opinions of the 
conflict within the Burundian community. Turner and Brønden have examined the roles of the earlier 
diasporas in their 2011 study, but research on the influence of the exile caused by the 2015–17 
political crisis is lacking at the moment. An inquiry among the members of the Burundian diaspora 
would bring more light to this issue, and by comparing their answers to the local conceptualisations 
of Burundians it would be possible to get qualitative data on the theme. 
Regarding the future of the Burundian conflict, the findings of this study do not present a positive 
scenario. As my research has demonstrated, the deadlock in the current situation has led to a 
stagnation in the peace process and it is hard to see a clear way forward in solving the crisis. If the 
parties could engage in an agonistic dialogue supported by an inclusive dialogue process, both of 
which would address the deep conflict issues including the history, past crimes and ethnic identities, 
there is a possibility to find a solution to the Burundian political conflict. Whether this attempt can 
succeed, remains to be seen. In the current situation, the Brussels-based civil society representative’s 
words illustrate the pessimistic attitude of many: 
In any case, a pacific solution, I am not very optimistic at the moment. 
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 Appendix 1 
Codebook 
 
Conceptualisations of violence 
 
1. Ethnicity 
2. Legality 
2.1. Constitution 
2.2. Institutions/institutional order 
2.3. Impunity 
3. Religion 
4. Sovereignty 
4.1. Foreign interference 
5. Security 
5.1. Terrorism 
5.2. Isolated attacks 
5.3. Violent political opposition 
6. Economy 
6.1. Natural resources 
7. Politics and power 
7.1. Democracy 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
7.2.1. Repression 
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
7.4. Resistance / fight 
7.5. Unity 
7.6. Patriotism 
7.7. Internal divisions 
8. Manipulation 
8.1. Political labelling 
8.2. Denial of reality 
9. Humanitarianism 
9.1. Refugee situation 
9.2. Disappearances 
10. Freedom of expression 
11. Human rights and their violations 
11.1. Violence and torture by state 
actors 
12. Militarism 
13. Killing 
13.1. Genocide 
13.2. State-sponsored killings 
14. Responsibility 
15. Fire 
16. Hunt 
17. History 
18. Normality 
 
 
19. Protraction 
20. Negotiated legitimacy 
21. Education 
22. Peace policy 
23. Psychology 
 
 
Conceptualisations of dialogue/solutions 
T. Armed resistance 
U. External pressure 
V. Refusal to dialogue 
W. Monologue 
X. Dialogue of the deaf 
Y. Inclusive dialogue 
Z. Formal negotiations 
 
 
Actors 
b = in Burundi 
d = in diaspora 
 
A. Government 
B. Opposition 
B1. Armed opposition 
C. Civil society 
C1. Youth 
C2. Women 
C3. Ordinary, politically active 
Burundian 
C4. Political civil society activist 
C5. Journalist 
D. Third parties 
D1. International community 
D1A. United Nations 
D1B. European Union 
D1C. United States 
D1D. European countries 
D2. Regional actors 
D2A. African Union 
D2B. East African Community 
D2C. Other African countries 
D3. Donors, funders 
E. Church/ religious communities
  
 
Appendix 2 
Interview and dialogue video coding matrix 
 
Narrative Category of conceptualisation To whom? / Actors mentioned 
1. The diplomat, 
31.1.2017 
Events in Burundi since 2015 
2.2. Institutional order 
2. Legality 
9.1. Refugee situation 
5.3. Violent political opposition 
 
7.1. Democracy 
4.1. Foreign interference 
2. Legality 
7. Politics and power 
7.1. Democracy 
4. Sovereignty 
4.1. Foreign interference 
6.1. Natural resources 
4.1. Foreign interference 
 
Current situation 
5. Security 
5.2. Isolated attacks 
5.1. Terrorism 
18. Normality 
7.1. Democracy 
Y. Inclusive dialogue, Z. Formal 
negotiations  
 
Dialogue 
5.3. Violent political opposition  
8. Manipulation  
2.2. Institutional order 
5. Security  
Z. Formal negotiations 
 
Y. Inclusive dialogue 
10. Freedom of expression 
 
 
5.3. Violent political opposition 
5.1. Terrorism 
6. Economy 
15. Fire 
 
4.1. Foreign interference 
 
Solutions 
7.1. Democracy  
7.3. Arusha Accords   
2.1. Constitution  
 
2.2. Institutions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D1A. United Nations, D2A. African Union,  
D2B. East African Community 
 
 
 
 
C3. Burundians 
 
 
 
D1A. United Nations, D2B. East African Community 
 
D2B. East African Community, D1. International  
community, D1A. United Nations 
 
 
 
 
D1D. European countries (Belgium?) 
D2B. East African Community 
D2C. Other African countries (Rwanda, Southern 
Africa) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7.1. Democracy  
2. Legality 
 
2. Legality 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
1. Ethnicity 
6. Economy 
2. Legality 
7. Power (revisiting the quotas) 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
 
2. Legality  
4. Sovereignty 
 
Personal narrative 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
 
6. Economy  
12. Militarism 
 
Ethnicisation 
8. Manipulation 
2.2. Institutions 
4.1. Foreign interference 
8. Manipulation  
6. Economy 
 
ICC 
2. Legality 
 
 
C. Civil society 
C3. Burundians 
 
B. Opposition 
 
 
 
 
D2. Regional actors, D1. International community 
D1C. United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D3. Donors, funders 
3. The journalist, 
1.2.2017 
7.2.1. Repression  
10. Freedom of expression 
 
Why violence ? 
13. Killing and death  
9.1. Refugee situation 
8.2. Denial of reality 
 
Reasons 
2.1. Constitution  
7.2. Authoritarianism 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
1. Ethnicity 
7. Politics and power  
7.2. Authoritarianism  
7.2.2. Clientelism 
7.7. Internal divisions 
V. Refusal to dialogue 
 
Dialogue 
10. Freedom of expression 
W. Monologue 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
8.1. Political labelling 
20. Negotiated legitimacy 
7.2.1. Repression 
10. Freedom of expression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Government 
 
 
 
 
A. Government 
C3. Burundians, D1. International community 
C. Civil society, D1A. United Nations, E. Church  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Government 
  
 
7.2.1. Repression 
V. Refusal to dialogue  
W. Monologue 
 
4. The civil society 
activist, 1.2.2017 
Events in Burundi since 2015 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
Why violence? 
17. History 
16. Hunt 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
7.2.1. Repression 
Current situation 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
12. Militarism 
5.2. Isolated attacks 
19. Protraction 
 
17. History 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
2.1. Constitution 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
6. Economy 
7.4. Resistance / fight 
 
Opposition and coup 
7.7. Internal divisions 
V. Refusal to dialogue 
 
Ethnicisation 
1 Ethnicity 
8.1. Political labelling 
8.1. Political labelling 
17. History 
7.2.1. Repression 
8. Manipulation 
13.2. State-sponsored killings  
1. Ethnicity 
8. Manipulation 
V. Refusal to dialogue 
11. Human rights 
7.2.1. Repression 
Dialogue 
W. Monologue  
X. Dialogue of the deaf 
U. External pressure  
 
7. Power  
7.3. Arusha Agreement  
2. Legality 
Y. Inclusive dialogue  
 
X. Dialogue of the deaf 
 
Solutions 
14. Responsibility 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
U. External pressure 
 
 
A. Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Opposition 
D1. International community, D2A. African Union, 
D2B. East African Community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Government 
 
D2A. African Union 
 
 
D1. International community 
D1A. United Nations, B. Opposition, C. Civil society 
D1. International community, B. Opposition,  
C. Civil society, A. Government 
D2B. East African Community 
D1. International community 
 
D1. International community 
 
 
 
  
 
Personal narrative 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
7.2.2. Clientelism 
17. History 
 
(Solutions) 
V. Refusal to dialogue 
U. External pressure 
 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
Z. Formal negotiations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D1. International community, D1C. United States,  
D1B. European Union, D2A. African Union 
5. Pancrace Cimpaye, 
CNARED, 2.2.2017 
Events in Burundi since 2015 
2. Legality 
5. Security 
2.2. Institutions 
9. Humanitarianism 
6. Economy 
1. Ethnicity 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
6. Economy 
Violence 
7.2.1. Repression 
9. Humanitarianism (9.1. Refugee 
situation, 9.2. Disappearances) 
2. Legality (absence) 
Reasons 
7.2.1. Repression 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
Opposition and coup 
2.1. Constitution 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
Current situation 
Z. Formal negotiations 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
7.4. Resistance/fight  
Z. Formal negotiations 
 
9.1. Refugee situation 
7.4. Resistance/fight 
T. Armed resistance 
16. Hunt 
1. Ethnicity 
7.4. Resistance/fight 
Z. Formal negotiations 
Ethnicisation 
13.1. Genocide 
16. Hunt 
13.1. Genocide 
2. Legality 
11. Human rights and their violations 
 
Dialogue 
W. Monologue 
Z. Formal negotiations 
Y. Inclusive dialogue 
 
Opposition and coup 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D1A. United Nations, D2A. African Union 
 
 
 
D1. International community, D1A. United Nations 
 
 
 
 
 
D2B. East African Community 
C. Civil society, C1. Youth,  
E. Church/religious communities, B1. Armed 
opposition 
  
 
20. Negotiated legitimacy 
7.5. Unity 
 
International community 
7.2.1. Repression 
U. External pressure 
U. External pressure (intervention) 
13. Killing 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
14. Responsibility 
 
Solutions 
2. Legality 
9.1. Refugee situation 
11. Human rights and their violations 
5. Security 
10. Freedom of expression 
2.2. Institutions/institutional order 
7. Politics and power 
 
Personal narrative 
7.1. Democracy 
7.2. Authoritarianism 
6. Economy 
7.4. Resistance/fight 
5. Security 
8.1. Political labelling 
 
 
 
 
 
D2A. African Union 
D1. International community 
D1A. United Nations 
D1A. United Nations 
 
 
D1A. United Nations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Civil society 
 
D2B. East African Community 
Civil society Inter-Burundian dialogue videos 
 
Actor, location, 
gender, association 
represented 
Category of conceptualisation To whom ? / Actors mentioned 
C4bM. ARDID, 
Association des 
rapatriés au Burundi 
(Association of the 
repatriated 
Burundians) 
Reasons 
7. Politics and power (before & after 
elections) 
Solutions 
7.1. Democracy 
2.1. Constitution 
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption 
21. Education 
 
13. Killing 
2.2. Institutions / institutional order 
1. Ethnicity 
6. Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Government, B. Opposition 
 
A. Government, B. Opposition (politicians),  
C. Civil society 
C4bM. ONACOM, 
Organisation 
nationale contre les 
catastrophes et 
l’obscurantisme de la 
mentalité (National 
organisation against 
catastrophes and the 
obscurantism of the 
mentality), relief 
organisation 
Reasons/solutions 
2.2. Institutions 
2.3. Impunity 
4.1. Foreign interference 
 
Z. Formal negotiations 
7.3. Arusha Accords 
6. Economy 
 
 
 
D1D. European countries, 
D2C. Other African countries 
(France, Belgium, Rwanda) 
  
 
C2/C4bF. AFRABU, 
Association des 
femmes rapatriées au 
Burundi (Association 
of the repatriated 
women in Burundi) 
Solutions 
6. Economy 
21. Education 
2.3. Impunity 
 
A. Government 
C2bF. Individual 
member of CAFOB, 
Collectif des 
organisations des 
femmes au Burundi 
(Collective of 
women’s 
organisations in 
Burundi) 
7.7. Internal divisions 
Solutions 
7.1. Democracy 
Y. Inclusive dialogue 
2.1. Constitution 
2.2. Institutions 
7.1. Democracy 
7.6. Patriotism 
22. Peace policy 
Reasons 
4. Sovereignty 
 
(politicians) 
 
 
C3. Burundians 
 
 
C3. Burundians 
 
 
C4bM. UNIPROBU, 
the association of the 
Twa 
Solutions 
Y. Inclusive dialogue 
9.1. Refugee situation 
21. Education 
Reasons 
17. History 
4.1. Foreign interference 
1. Ethnicity 
 
 
 
 
 
D1D. European countries (coloniser) 
C4bM. ACPDH, 
Association 
communautaire pour 
la promotion et la 
protection des droits 
de l’homme au 
Burundi 
(Communitarian 
association for the 
promotion and 
protection of human 
rights in Burundi) 
Reasons/solutions 
6.1. Natural resources 
6. Economy 
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption 
17. History 
7.6. Patriotism 
 
 
 
C3. Burundians 
C1/EbM. Youth 
Commission 
International  
Burundi.  
Solutions 
3. Religion 
11. Human rights 
Reasons 
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption 
Solutions 
21. Education 
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption 
Y. Inclusive dialogue 
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